Vulnerability Assessment of Electrical Cyber-Physical Systems against Cyber Attacks

Wang, Yinan; Yan, Gangfeng; Zheng, Ronghao

doi:10.3390/app8050768

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…The different parts of the physical system are connected through a network system. The CPS consists of a computational control system, a communication network, and a physical environment, forming a complex system involving real‐time sensing, dynamic control and information decision‐making [4]. The CPPS is an extension of the CPS in the field of power systems.…”

Section: Background and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtual‐physical power flow method for cyber‐physical power system contingency and vulnerability assessment

Qiu,

Zhang,

Zhou

et al. 2023

IET Smart Grid

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Traditional power systems have evolved into cyber‐physical power systems (CPPS) with the integration of information and communication technologies. CPPS can be considered as a typical hierarchical control system that can be divided into two parts: the power grid and the communication network. CPPS will face new vulnerabilities which can have network contingencies and cascading consequences. To address this challenge, a virtual‐physical power flow (VPPF) method is proposed for the vulnerability assessment of CPPS. The proposed method contains dual power flows, one is to simulate a virtual power flow from decision‐making units, and the other is to simulate a physical power flow. In addition, a novel hierarchical control model is proposed that includes four layers of CPPS: the physical layer, the secondary device layer, the regional control layer, and the national control layer. The model is based on IEEE test cases using data and structures provided by MATPOWER. Denial‐of‐service (DoS) and false data injection (FDI) are simulated as two major cyber‐attacks in CPPS. A novel vulnerability index is proposed that consists of system voltage, network latency, and node betweenness as three key indicators. This is a comprehensive and adaptive index because it encompasses both cyber and physical system characteristics and can be applied to several types of cyber‐attacks. The results of the vulnerability assessment are compared in national and regional control structures of CPPS to evaluate the vulnerability of cyber‐physical nodes.

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Section: Background and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtual‐physical power flow method for cyber‐physical power system contingency and vulnerability assessment

Qiu,

Zhang,

Zhou

et al. 2023

IET Smart Grid

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The corresponding output matrix C is C = 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 In the meantime, we obtain F and B f0 by the condition equations ( 15) and ( 16) The initial conditions of the system and the observer are set to x(0) = ½À0:045, À 0:058, À 0:07, 0, 0:1, 0:01, x(0) = 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ½ . Since the vulnerability of each load in the power system is different, 37 in the next section, we will select different values of D-LAA to attack each load and complete the attack location.…”

Section: System Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptive observer-based attack location and defense strategy in smart grid

Wang¹,

Lin

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part I:

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This article mainly focuses on the attack location and defense of cyber-physical power systems under dynamic load altering attacks. Taking the smart grid as an example, first, the cyber-physical power system model under attack is established to provide conditions for attack detection. On this basis, an adaptive observer with [Formula: see text] performance is designed to realize detection and location through residual signal and attack estimation, respectively. Furthermore, a power redistribution strategy based on optimal economic scheduling is presented to realize attack defense by means of the observer data. Finally, theoretical analysis proves the feasibility of the algorithm, and simulation cases prove the effectiveness of attack location and defense strategies.

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“…Although, this transformation has many advantages, it has resulted in systems that are traditionally configured to operate in an air gap environment (i.e. a server cluster without access to the internet) to be exposed to new threats which originate in the cyber domain [18], [19], [22], [25], [29]. The perceived threat of a large impact cyber-attack on control systems proved to be a reality in 2010 with the launch of the Stuxnet worm [9], prompting plant owners, engineers, technicians, and researchers to feel the need to design and develop algorithms, tools, and techniques to protect the security of control systems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Covert System Identification Attack on Constant Setpoint Control Systems

Phillips

Mehrpouyan

Gardner

et al. 2019

2019 Seventh International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops (CANDARW)

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Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are the brain and backbone of nation's critical infrastructure such as nuclear power, water treatment, and petrochemical plants. In order to increase interoperability, real-time availability of data, and flexibility, information/communication technologies are adopted in this domain. While these information technologies have been effective, they are integrated into operational technologies without the necessary security defense. Designing an effective, layered security defense is not possible unless security threats are identified through a structural analysis of the ICS. For that reason, this paper provides an attacker's point of view on the reconnaissance effort necessary to gather details of the system dynamics-which are required for the development of sophisticated attacks. We present a reconnaissance approach which uses the system's I/O data to infer the dynamic model of the system. In this effort, we propose a novel cyber-attack which targets the controller proportional-integral-derivative gain values in a constant setpoint control system. Our findings will help researchers design more secure control systems.

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Vulnerability Assessment of Electrical Cyber-Physical Systems against Cyber Attacks

Cited by 8 publications

References 35 publications

Virtual‐physical power flow method for cyber‐physical power system contingency and vulnerability assessment

Virtual‐physical power flow method for cyber‐physical power system contingency and vulnerability assessment

Adaptive observer-based attack location and defense strategy in smart grid

A Covert System Identification Attack on Constant Setpoint Control Systems

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