Wage Relationships —The Comparative Impact of Market and Power Forces

Kerr, Clark

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15205-6_12

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…For earlier examples, see Reynolds (1946), Lester (1948), Myers and Shultz (1951), Dunlop (1957), Kerr (1957), and Rees and Shultz (1970). In the U.S., the field lay mostly dormant until Groshen's (1987) useful study.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Wage Structure and Dynamics in the Electronics Industry

Leonard¹

1989

Industrial Relations

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This study analyzes wage patterns over time among California electronics employers. While the range of wages paid is substantial, employers on average make only small departures from market wage that are not pervasive across occupations or persistent across time. Employers appear able to change employment levels without affecting wages. Internal wage relativities also appear flexible. Differences between administered wage scales and actual wages paid are used to distinguish wage policy from market outcomes.

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confidence: 99%

Wage Structure and Dynamics in the Electronics Industry

Leonard¹

1989

Industrial Relations

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“…Douglas (1958) undertook an ambitious analysis of grievance procedures, union status provisions, and fringe benefits, in addition to 4Additionally, a considerable literature before 1970 investigated the role of unions in erasing wage differentials at the occupational, interplant (including interfirm), interindustry, and geographical levels. Prominent examples are McCabe (1912), Lester and Robie (1946), Reynolds (1957), Kerr (1957), andMacDonald (1963). These studies found that unions did indeed strive for wage standardization across firms as well as within firms, and found strong evidence that many unions drove the wage structure toward greater uniformity within industries.…”

Section: Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Determinants and Extent of UAW Pattern Bargaining

Budd¹

1992

ILR Review

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The author, using two new data sets covering UAW contract outcomes in a wide range of industries, estimates the degree to which the union's target settlement with a Big Three automaker was followed in subsequent settlements in the same bargaining round over the years 1955-79 and 1987-90. Using several different specifications and examining both wage levels and percent wage increases, he finds that target settlements had large, statistically significant spillover effects in all years, although the effects were considerably smaller in 1987-90 than in 1955-79. Bargaining unit size and industry had important influences on pattern-following in all years. Firm-specific financial health indicators had little influence on pattern-following in the earlier period, but an important influence in 1987-90. THE

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“…The tendency toward wage structure leveling stems from a desire on the part of unions to eliminate arbitrary pay differences and a desire to create feelings of solidarity and social justice among union members (see Slichter, Healy, and Livernash, 1960;Reynolds and Taft, 1956).3 The former manifests itself in the familiar call for "the removal of wages from competition." This demand reflects the conviction that wage determination by market forces is imperfect, and that market outcomes may thereby contain arbitrary differences in pay (see, especially, Kerr, 1957;also, Reynolds and Taft, 1956). Achieving solidarity and justice in the distribution of rewards may require moving beyond the elimination of arbitrary pay differences to a significant leveling of the occupational wage structure.…”

Section: Wage Levelingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compensating Wage Differentials in the Union and Nonunion Sectors

Fairris¹

1989

Industrial Relations

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This paper tests for the existence of structurally different compensating payments in the union and nonunion sectors of the economy. Significant differences may stem from the different mechanisms by which such payments are determined: markets are the primary mechanism in the nonunion sector, while Political processes play a major role in the union sector. The empirical results provide tentative support for the structural differences hypothesis; They also reveal an absence of positive and significant compensating payments in nonunion labor markets.

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Wage Relationships —The Comparative Impact of Market and Power Forces

Cited by 12 publications

References 2 publications

Wage Structure and Dynamics in the Electronics Industry

Wage Structure and Dynamics in the Electronics Industry

The Determinants and Extent of UAW Pattern Bargaining

Compensating Wage Differentials in the Union and Nonunion Sectors

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