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Managed care uses financial incentives and restrictions on tests and procedures to attempt to influence physician decision making and limit costs. Increasingly, the public is questioning whether physicians are truly making decisions based on the patient's best interest or are unduly influenced by economic incentives. These circumstances lead to the potential for disagreements and conflict in the patient-physician relationship. We convened a group of individuals in October 1998, including patient representatives, leaders from health care organizations, practicing physicians, communication experts, and medical ethicists, to articulate the types of disagreements emerging in the patient-physician relationship as a result of managed care. We addressed 3 specific scenarios physicians may encounter, including allocation, illustrated by a patient who is referred to a different ophthalmologist based on a new arrangement in the physician's group; access, illustrated by a patient who wishes to see his own physician for a same-day visit rather than a nurse specialist; and financial incentives, illustrated by a patient who expects to have a test performed and a physician who does not believe the test is necessary but is afraid the patient will think the physician is not ordering the test because of financial incentives. Using these scenarios, we suggest communication strategies that physicians can use to decrease the potential for disagreements. In addition, we propose strategies that health plans or physician groups can use to alleviate or resolve these disagreements.

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The initial results of a 12-month controlled trial of a health promotion program in 5686 Bank of America retirees, randomized into full program, questionnaire only, and insurance claims only groups, were analyzed to determine whether the health promotion program was effective. Comparisons were between program and questionnaire only groups for self-reported health habit changes, health risk scores, medical care utilization, and days confined to home, and between all groups for insurance claims data. The intervention, or full program, included health habit questionnaires administered every 6 months, individualized time-oriented health risk appraisals, personal recommendation letters, self-management materials, and a health promotion book. Twelve-month changes in health habits, health status, and economic variables favored the full program group in 31 of 32 comparisons and were statistically significant at the .05 level in two-tailed tests in 19 comparisons and at the .01 level in two-tailed tests in 13 comparisons. Over 12 months, overall computed health risk scores decreased by 4.3% in the full program experimental group and increased by 7.2% in the questionnaire only control group. Total direct and indirect costs decreased by 11% in the experimental group and increased by 6.3% in the questionnaire only control group. Analysis of claims data confirmed these trends. A low-cost health promotion program for retirees was effective in changing health behaviors and has potential to decrease health care utilization.