Warrant without truth?

Coffman, E. J.

doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9178-5

Cited by 47 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Cases have been described where a true yet unknown premise allegedly grounds deductive knowledge (Coffman 2008;Luzzi 2010). E.J.…”

Section: Knowledge From a True-yet-unknown Premisementioning

confidence: 99%

What Does Knowledge-Yielding Deduction Require of Its Premises?

Luzzi¹

2014

Episteme

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According to the principle of Knowledge Counter-Closure (KCC), knowledge-yielding single-premise deduction requires a known premise: if S believes q solely on the basis of deduction from p, and S knows q, then S must know p. Although prima facie plausible, widely accepted, and supported by seemingly compelling motivations, KCC has recently been challenged by cases where S arguably knows q solely on the basis of deduction from p, yet p is false (Warfield 2005; Fitelson 2010) or p is true but not known (Coffman 2008; Luzzi 2010). I explore a view that resolves this tension by abandoning KCC in the light of these challenges, and which acknowledges their force but also their limits. Adopting this view helps identify the epistemic constraints that operate on the premises of knowledge-yielding deduction, clarifies the epistemic role of deduction, and allows us to distil the kernel of truth in the motivations that are standardly taken to support KCC.

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“…Cases have been described where a true yet unknown premise allegedly grounds deductive knowledge (Coffman 2008;Luzzi 2010). E.J.…”

Section: Knowledge From a True-yet-unknown Premisementioning

confidence: 99%

What Does Knowledge-Yielding Deduction Require of Its Premises?

Luzzi¹

2014

Episteme

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“…Coffman (2008) accepts that there are genuine cases of knowledge from falsehood: that is, unlike us, he doesn't argue against this view of Warfield's; rather, he attempts to uncover necessary conditions for cases of knowledge from falsehood. In particular, he proposes the following:…”

Section: Coffmanmentioning

confidence: 95%

Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood

Ball¹,

Blome-Tillmann²

2014

The Philosophical Quarterly

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Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite falsehood. We also show that the principle of counter closure, and the concomitant denial of knowledge from falsehood, is well motivated by considerations in epistemological theory-in particular, by the view that knowledge is first in the epistemological order of things.

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“…3 Explicitly-stated arguments are found inZagzebski (1994),Merricks (1995Merricks ( , 1997,Balmert and Greene (1997),Blome-Tillman (2007), andCoffman (2008). The objections to these arguments are found inRyan (1996),Howard-Snyder et al (2003), andCoffman (2008). The objections inHoward-Snyder et al (2003) andCoffman (2008) have yet to receive replies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The objections to these arguments are found inRyan (1996),Howard-Snyder et al (2003), andCoffman (2008). The objections inHoward-Snyder et al (2003) andCoffman (2008) have yet to receive replies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%