Abstract:According to the principle of Knowledge Counter-Closure (KCC), knowledge-yielding single-premise deduction requires a known premise: if S believes q solely on the basis of deduction from p, and S knows q, then S must know p. Although prima facie plausible, widely accepted, and supported by seemingly compelling motivations, KCC has recently been challenged by cases where S arguably knows q solely on the basis of deduction from p, yet p is false (Warfield 2005; Fitelson 2010) or p is true but not known (Coffman … Show more
“…The argument in this paragraph is consistent with the principle that Luzzi (, p. 269) calls ‘Epistemic Responsibility Counter‐Closure’: ‘necessarily, if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduction from her belief that p, and (ii) S's belief that q is responsibly held, then S's belief that p is responsibly held.’ Later in Section 6, particularly endnote 15, I will argue that Luzzi's principle is importantly different from Single‐Premise JFJ, and therefore no threat to the argument I give in this paragraph.…”
supporting
confidence: 72%
“… Consider again Luzzi's (, p. 269) principle, ‘Epistemic Responsibility Counter‐Closure’: ‘necessarily, if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduction from her belief that p, and (ii) S's belief that q is responsibly held, then S's belief that p is responsibly held.’ This principle is more akin to Single‐Premise JFJ* than Single‐Premise JFJ since (i) has only inference conferring the status being responsibly held on S's conclusion belief that p, thus excluding any supplementary role that might need to be played by reflection, introspection, etc. It is worth noting a difficulty for this principle. The species of epistemic responsibility that Luzzi has in mind appears to be internalist in character since it is a condition on a belief's being held in an epistemically responsible way that this status be ascertainable by the subject (, p. 270). Moreover, if a belief is irresponsibly held, then the subject ‘should have done epistemically better in some respect or other’ (, p. 272).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The species of epistemic responsibility that Luzzi has in mind appears to be internalist in character since it is a condition on a belief's being held in an epistemically responsible way that this status be ascertainable by the subject (, p. 270). Moreover, if a belief is irresponsibly held, then the subject ‘should have done epistemically better in some respect or other’ (, p. 272). But take the basic internalist worry: when one reasons validly, but does not know she reasons validly (though she can ascertain this), she has failed to do her epistemic best.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consider again Luzzi's (, p. 269) principle, ‘Epistemic Responsibility Counter‐Closure’: ‘necessarily, if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduction from her belief that p, and (ii) S's belief that q is responsibly held, then S's belief that p is responsibly held.’ This principle is more akin to Single‐Premise JFJ* than Single‐Premise JFJ since (i) has only inference conferring the status being responsibly held on S's conclusion belief that p, thus excluding any supplementary role that might need to be played by reflection, introspection, etc.…”
Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification (JFJ): a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially justified belief that is more permissive and more complex than JFJ. This paper argues against a popular epistemic principle of inferential justification. The principle says that a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. I call this principle, Justification from Justification, or JFJ. In the first section, I discuss JFJ's importance. In the second, I explore its logical relations to some similar principles. In the third, I articulate the version of it that I will argue against. In the fourth, I present and defend a counterexample to that version. And in the fifth and sixth, I reply to two important objections and suggest how we can reject JFJ while still retaining the basing condition on justified belief.
“…The argument in this paragraph is consistent with the principle that Luzzi (, p. 269) calls ‘Epistemic Responsibility Counter‐Closure’: ‘necessarily, if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduction from her belief that p, and (ii) S's belief that q is responsibly held, then S's belief that p is responsibly held.’ Later in Section 6, particularly endnote 15, I will argue that Luzzi's principle is importantly different from Single‐Premise JFJ, and therefore no threat to the argument I give in this paragraph.…”
supporting
confidence: 72%
“… Consider again Luzzi's (, p. 269) principle, ‘Epistemic Responsibility Counter‐Closure’: ‘necessarily, if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduction from her belief that p, and (ii) S's belief that q is responsibly held, then S's belief that p is responsibly held.’ This principle is more akin to Single‐Premise JFJ* than Single‐Premise JFJ since (i) has only inference conferring the status being responsibly held on S's conclusion belief that p, thus excluding any supplementary role that might need to be played by reflection, introspection, etc. It is worth noting a difficulty for this principle. The species of epistemic responsibility that Luzzi has in mind appears to be internalist in character since it is a condition on a belief's being held in an epistemically responsible way that this status be ascertainable by the subject (, p. 270). Moreover, if a belief is irresponsibly held, then the subject ‘should have done epistemically better in some respect or other’ (, p. 272).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The species of epistemic responsibility that Luzzi has in mind appears to be internalist in character since it is a condition on a belief's being held in an epistemically responsible way that this status be ascertainable by the subject (, p. 270). Moreover, if a belief is irresponsibly held, then the subject ‘should have done epistemically better in some respect or other’ (, p. 272). But take the basic internalist worry: when one reasons validly, but does not know she reasons validly (though she can ascertain this), she has failed to do her epistemic best.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consider again Luzzi's (, p. 269) principle, ‘Epistemic Responsibility Counter‐Closure’: ‘necessarily, if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduction from her belief that p, and (ii) S's belief that q is responsibly held, then S's belief that p is responsibly held.’ This principle is more akin to Single‐Premise JFJ* than Single‐Premise JFJ since (i) has only inference conferring the status being responsibly held on S's conclusion belief that p, thus excluding any supplementary role that might need to be played by reflection, introspection, etc.…”
Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification (JFJ): a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially justified belief that is more permissive and more complex than JFJ. This paper argues against a popular epistemic principle of inferential justification. The principle says that a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. I call this principle, Justification from Justification, or JFJ. In the first section, I discuss JFJ's importance. In the second, I explore its logical relations to some similar principles. In the third, I articulate the version of it that I will argue against. In the fourth, I present and defend a counterexample to that version. And in the fifth and sixth, I reply to two important objections and suggest how we can reject JFJ while still retaining the basing condition on justified belief.
“…In contrast, other philosophers contend that one can gain knowledge by reasoning from false or unknown premises (e.g., Fitelson ; Klein ; Luzzi ; Saunders and Champawat ; Turri , ; Warfield ). Again, one motivation for this view is that it helps explain intuitions about knowledge in certain types of cases, such as these: The news channel breaks in with a live report: “The President is speaking now to supporters in Utah.” Ted reasons, “The President is in Utah; therefore he is not attending today's NATO talks in Brussels.” But the President is speaking at a “border rally” at the Utah‐Nevada border and the speaking platform he is standing on is in Nevada.…”
Philosophers have debated whether it is possible to knowledgeably infer a conclusion from a false premise. For example, if a fan believes that the actress's dress is blue, but the dress is actually green, can the fan knowledgeably infer "the dress is not red" from "the dress is blue?" One aspect of this debate concerns what the intuitively correct verdict is about specific cases such as this. Here, I report a simple behavioral experiment that helps answer this question. The main finding is that people attribute knowledge in cases where a true conclusion is inferred from a false premise. People did this despite judging that the premise was false and unknown. People also viewed the agent as inferring the conclusion from the premise. In closely matched conditions where the conclusion was false, people did not attribute knowledge of the conclusion. These results support the view that the ordinary knowledge concept includes in its extension cases of knowledge inferred from false premises.
Plato claimed, in the Meno (97a-98c), that knowledge is more valuable than true belief in virtue of it being more stable than true belief. Knowledge, Plato argued, is a more reliable guide to action than true belief: the traveler who
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