Justified Belief from Unjustified Belief

Abstract

Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification (JFJ): a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially justified belief that is more permissive and more complex than JFJ. This paper argues against a popular epistemic principle of inferential justification. The principle says that a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. I call this principle, Justification from Justification, or JFJ. In the first section, I discuss JFJ's importance. In the second, I explore its logical relations to some similar principles. In the third, I articulate the version of it that I will argue against. In the fourth, I present and defend a counterexample to that version. And in the fifth and sixth, I reply to two important objections and suggest how we can reject JFJ while still retaining the basing condition on justified belief.

Knowledge From Forgetting

“…It is a case of justified true belief from unjustified true belief as opposed to knowledge from falsehood. That said, the seat counter case does bear some resemblance to a case discussed by Murphy (). In Murphy's case, someone called Fred has a memory based belief that he has a meeting with Mary next Wednesday at noon.…”

Restaurando a Explicação do Anulabilismo Falibilista sobre o Conhecimento a partir de Crença Falsa

“…10 Essas teses impossibilitam também a obtenção de conhecimento inferencial a partir de crença gettierizada e de crença injustificada, por exemplo. Para mais informações, veja Luzzi (2014Luzzi ( , 2019, Olivier (2019), Murphy (2017). 11 Embora possa haver casos nos quais uma crença verdadeira e uma crença falsa, independentes entre si, sejam os fatores causais e evidenciais de uma outra crença verdadeira que é uma instância de conhecimento, perceba que esse tipo de caso não é um contraexemplo ao princípio CFC.…”

A Dilemma for the Knowledge Despite Falsehood Strategy

“…Those who think that knowledge cannot come from falsehood presumably do so on the grounds that beliefs that amount to inferential knowledge cannot be properly based on false beliefs. Peter Murphy (2015) has suggested that a false unjustified belief may still serve as the proper basis for a justified belief. While Murphy's discussion is not directly concerned with knowledge from falsehood, his discussion of proper basing involves a case of a false belief serving as the proper basis for an inferred justified belief.…”

“…In particular, it belongs to beliefs that are themselves unjustified but nonetheless allow justification to pass through to some beliefs that are validly and competently deduced from them. (Murphy 2015: 11)…”

“…In the present case, Fred infers from his memory-based belief that he has a meeting with Mary at noon next Wednesday to the conclusion-belief that he has a meeting with Mary sometime next week. (Murphy 2015: 6–7)…”