WAS-guided cooperation in water: the grand coalition and sub-coalitions

Abstract

This paper builds on the earlier development of WAS -a method of dealing with water issues that focuses on water values rather than water quantities and takes into account public values that are not simply private ones (see Fisher et al., 2005). WAS can be used for infrastructure or policy planning, but it can also assist in the resolution of water disputes. Indeed, WAS-guided cooperation in water can turn what appears to be a zero-sum gain into a win-win situation. It is shown that if WAS sets the rules for cooperation, then, when all claimants use those rules, the coalition of all of them together is stable. Results for possible coalitions of Israel, Jordan, and Palestine are given for varying assumptions as to water ownership. The gains from cooperation are compared and analyzed. WAS-guided cooperation is seen to make the value of ownership shifts relatively trivial.

Raising the Dead without a Red Sea-Dead Sea project? Hydro-economics and governance

“…An outside institution could purchase water from the countries with purchases occurring only when purchase prices (i) exceed the scarcity (and other) costs borne by users in the country selling the water, but are (ii) less than the environmental value of water returned to the Dead Sea. There are several common objections to market-based water purchases (Richards and Singh, 2001) and responses (Fisher and Huber-Lee, 2009;Fisher et al, 2005). Here, I address issues 1252 D. E. Rosenberg: Raising the Dead without a Red Sea-Dead Sea project?…”

“…2. to purchase water for environmental purposes (Murphy et al, 2009). First, the most effective market will involve a grand coalition of all countries (although one or more countries may only nominally participate) (Fisher and Huber-Lee, 2009). Second, no countries may choose to sell.…”

“…Setting appropriate sale prices is key to establish a successful market for environmental purchases. And WAS model shadow values for water to meet the Dead Sea flow constraint (Table 2) can help guide price setting (Fisher and Huber-Lee, 2009;Fisher et al, 2005). These shadow values represent the scarcity value of water and minimum price an outside institution must offer to successfully purchase water from a country.…”

Raising the dead without a Red Sea-Dead Sea canal? Hydro-economics and governance

“…There are several common objections to market-based water purchases (Richards and Singh, 2001) and responses (Fisher and Huber-Lee, 2009;Fisher et al, 2005). Here, I address issues to purchase water for environmental purposes (Murphy et al, 2009).…”

“…Here, I address issues to purchase water for environmental purposes (Murphy et al, 2009). First, the most effective market will involve a grand coalition of all countries (although one or more countries may only nominally participate) (Fisher and Huber-Lee, 2009). Second, no countries may choose to sell.…”