Watchdogs or guard dogs: Do anti-corruption agencies need strong teeth?

Abstract

Anti-corruption advocates worldwide deride ''toothless'' anti-corruption agencies and demand agencies ''with teeth,'' meaning strong law enforcement powers. However, there are drawbacks to such powers. This paper draws from the documented experiences of dozens of anti-corruption agencies worldwide to show that law enforcement powers are not determinative of agency effectiveness, nor are they always helpful. Rather, both ''guard dog'' agencies, which use law-enforcement powers to address crimes of corruption directly, and ''watchdog'' agencies, which merely uncover and report corruption issues, face unique challenges and constraints. An anti-corruption agency's powers may influence its strategic response to its operating environment, but ultimately are less critical to corruption reduction than other factors such as independence, political will, and the reliability of partner institutions.

Exploring the Dynamics of Delegation Over Time: Insights from Italian Anti‐Corruption Agencies (2003–2016)

“…This article has examined changes in Italian ACAs' mandates and power over time. Since Italian ACAs correspond to the “watchdog” type mentioned by Kuris (, p. 33), our findings challenge the argument according to which this type of agency would be “less politically controversial” than the “guard dog” type. Instead, it appears that Italian ACAs have been subjected to constant tension and political struggles that make delegation “a rollercoaster shaped by changes in government” (Batory, ).…”

“…The analyses of the special commission triggered a parliamentary debate on different aspects of anti‐corruption strategy, including the introduction of a dedicated agency (Camera dei deputati‐Comitato di studio sulla prevenzione della corruzione, ). The debate has revolved around the fundamental distinction between ACAs with powers of law enforcement (“guard dog” type) and those that lack such powers (“watchdog” type) (Kuris, ). However, a number of concerns regarding the effectiveness of both types within the Italian context prevented the Parliament from introducing an ACA.…”

Watching EU watchdogs assessing the accountability powers of the European Court of auditors and the European Ombudsman

“…When are these watchdog institutions doing well? Good governance requires watchdogs 'with sharp ears and a good bark' (Kuris 2015). Elsewhere (Bovens and Wille 2020) we have developed a watchdog accountability power framework.…”

Corruption research: A need for an integrated approach

“…Effective anti-corruption agencies are especially vital for substantive anti-corruption efforts as they can independently focus efforts to combat corruption (Gregory, 2015; Meagher, 2004; Transparency International, 2015; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012). The anti-corruption agencies are especially effective in democracies where they are supported in their anti-corruption efforts by free media and robust democratic processes (Krajewska and Makowski, 2017; Kuris, 2015; Quah, 2017). Effective e-governments can lower overall corruption levels in the country (Agarwal and Maiti, 2020; Funk and Owen, 2020; Sanmukhiya, 2019), although some scholars find that e-governance is effective at reducing corruption only if the country has a strong rule of law (Park and Kim, 2019).…”