Welfare Economics, Ethics, and Essentialism

Archibald, G. C.

doi:10.2307/2550868

Cited by 33 publications

(17 citation statements)

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“…Subsequent debates have always been couched in both the language of value and the positive–normative distinction—see e.g. Friedman (1953); Archibald (1959); Lipsey (1963); Hutchison (1964); Machlup (1978, chapter 9) 2 . The implicit connection is that a statement made by an economist counts as normative if it is paired with a value judgment made by that economist (not somebody else), and as positive otherwise (in particular, it may bear on somebody else's value judgments).…”

Section: Neutrality: a Preview Of The Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics

Mongin

2006

Economica

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The paper analyses economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from actual value judgments. From this basis, it compares four solutions to the value neutrality problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is illegitimate) and non-neutrality (the social sciences are value-impregnated), the paper settles the case between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non-neutrality thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other weak thesis does. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2006.

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Section: Neutrality: a Preview Of The Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics

Mongin

2006

Economica

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“…Period 11's dominant ideas, relating either to absolute or relative deprivation of health care, were worked out with greater rigour than perid 1's. However, they suffered from failing to note that, although it is conventionally regarded as neither possible nor necessary to subject ethical value judgements to empirical test (unless one belongs to the school of thought which asserts that welfare economics concerns the most efficient way of satisfying given wants-and that these wants are empirically verifiable, at least in principle [Archibald, 1959]), yet it is necessary to test empirically the associated assumptions about what choice-objects people actually have (including external effects). Period 11's policy recommendations remain unconvincing without this, particularly as the positivist implications of the period I1 models are not well supported by the evidence.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Externality Models and Health:a Rückblick over the last Twenty Years*

Culyer

Simpson

1980

Economic Record

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Economists interested in the political economy of health have attempted to provide a theoretical justification for intervention in the market for health services. Traditional externality analysis, at most, provides a case for variable price subsidies, and the implications of such models do not correspond with the features of existing health care systems. This paper suggests that if the externality is viewed as arising directly from health status, the problem for health policy becomes essentially an engineering one requiring careful analysis of the technical relationships between health services and status. Variable price subsidies are not an obvious implication since individual marginal values of health care become largely irrelevant. Contract costs may be minimized if the ‘firm’ is very large and this may provide the beginning of an explanation for direct State involvement in the production and distribution of health care.

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“…The bottom line is that neither Blaug nor Hennipman offered an entirely persuasive defense of their position, and perhaps worse, actually seem to have made the issues, and their positions on the issues, even less clear. If one goes back before this exchange and reads Archibald (1959) and Blaug (1978) one is clear about the two positions; one may agree with one rather than the other, or parts of each, or even support something different than either one, but one understands what the authors are saying about the new welfare economics. After the Hennipman-Blaug debate, that no longer seems to be the case.…”

Section: Hands / Blaug On the Normativity Of Welfare Economics Erasmumentioning

confidence: 99%

Mark Blaug on the Normativity of Welfare Economics

Hands

2012

SSRN Journal

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This article examines Mark Blaug's position on the normative character of Paretian welfare economics in general, and also specifically with respect to his debate with Pieter Hennipman over this question during the 1990s. The article also clarifies some of the confusions that emerged within the context of this debate, and provides as a conclusion some additional arguments supporting Mark Blaug's position, which he himself did not provide.

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Welfare Economics, Ethics, and Essentialism

Cited by 33 publications

References 0 publications

Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics

Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics

Externality Models and Health:a Rückblick over the last Twenty Years*

Mark Blaug on the Normativity of Welfare Economics

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