What Can and Can't Crowding Theories Tell Us about Farmers’ ‘Environmental’ Intentions in Post‐Agri‐Environment Scheme Contexts?

Abstract

The termination of the Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) Agri‐Environment Scheme in England provides a unique opportunity for testing and exploring the so‐called crowding‐out theory. The theory posits that payment for the provision of public goods leads to a reduction in the intrinsic motivation for their supply. Through a small qualitative case‐study in Southwest England we explore farmers’ intentions to continue with ‘environmental behaviours’ following the cessation of ELS. Contrary to the crowding‐out theory we find that farmers will continue with longstanding ‘environmental practices’ that were financially rewarded by the ELS, but will pick and choose whether to continue with newly introduced practices depending on how they fit with farmers’ existing cultural, economic and instrumental priorities. Moreover, we argue that the crowding‐out theory is based on a set of assumptions and simplifications that do not adequately help us interpret the relationship between farmers’ motives, practices and intentions. In particular, we show that intrinsic and extrinsic motives cannot straightforwardly be separated and that definitions of what constitutes an ‘environmental behaviour’ are far more complex than is often assumed.

Understanding farmers’ motivations for providing unsubsidised environmental benefits

“…However, as we also reveal, the activities classed as 'environmental' may have been extrinsically motivated, rather implemented solely for environmental benefits. This supports Darragh and Emery's (2017) finding that definitions of what constitutes environmental behaviour on a farm is complex.…”

“…The evidence suggests that these economic incentives are an important factor to increase farmers' explicit participation in environmental management, in particular if payments and schemes are tailored to local natural and agronomic conditions (Bräuer et al, 2006). However, whilst some evidence suggests that AES can deliver durable changes in farmers' attitudes and behaviour (Crabtree et al, 1999;Darragh and Emery, 2017;Fish et al, 2003), others argue that AES have not resulted in a broad pro-environmental behavioural change amongst European farmers (Burton et al, 2008;Van Herzele et al, 2013). Some would argue further that AES have created complacency with farmers only adopting agri-environmental options that require no or minimal effort (Hodge and Reader, 2010;Schmitzberger et al, 2005;Wilson and Hart, 2000) and viewing environmental management as a public good for which they should be paid to deliver (Hodge and Reader, 2010).…”

“…In addition, it has also been argued that some extrinsic motivations can undermine and suppress intrinsic motivations (Ryan and Deci, 2000) and can even lead to crowding out of intrinsic motivations (Greiner and Gregg, 2011). Although, others suggest that the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations is more complex and cannot be straightforwardly separated (Darragh and Emery, 2017).…”

Exploring motivation crowding around farmer incentives for riparian management in Nova Scotia

“…Second‐hand crowding was able to be tested using the experimental treatment and control of the INELIGIBLE cohort, recognizing that our framing treatment may not have been adequately strong to incite such spillover effects, and here we find no indications of crowding in or out. These results are contrary to the hypotheses presented in some motivation crowding theory (Frey and Jegen ), and the types of motivation crowding discussed in Darragh and Emery () and Rode et al (), though call for much more research. The only other statistical differences we found among our cohorts were between ELIGIBLE and INELIGIBLE on statements about Waste and Guilt, as well as whether they were already doing riparian management.…”

The accidental environmentalists: Factors affecting farmers’ adoption of pro-environmental activities in England and Ontario

“…of the province, where agricultural capability is highest, land conversion has been particularly significant such as the conversion of more than 85 per cent of wetlands in part for agricultural production (Nebel, Brick, Lantz, & Trenholm, 2017 also mean that 36,100 farmers, previously enrolled in ELS, will need to decide whether to maintain stewardship practices for which they no longer receive compensation (Darragh & Emery, 2017). The use of a targeted and competitive approach to agri-environmental schemes O competitive with actions cost-shared by farmers.…”