2011
DOI: 10.1080/02643294.2011.609813
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What can individual differences tell us about the specialization of function?

Abstract: Can the study of individual differences inform debates about modularity and the specialization of function? In this article, we consider the implications of a highly replicated, robust finding known as positive manifold: Individual differences in different cognitive domains tend to be positively intercorrelated. Prima facie, this fact, which has generally been interpreted as reflecting the influence of a domain-general cognitive factor, might be seen as posing a serious challenge to a strong view of modularity… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…A significant amount of evidence suggests that in humans, the scores obtained in different cognitive tests correlate with each other, so that a global factor, called “g” for general intelligence, accounts for an important part of total variance (at least 40 percent, Deary et al, 2010). This suggests that cognitive abilities are not totally independent of each other, sharing (at least partly) a common mechanism (e.g., Ebisch et al, 2012 but see also Rabaglia et al, 2011). In fact, more and more evidence indicates that general cognitive abilities originate from a network of interconnected cortical areas (Deary et al, 2010).…”
Section: Intra-specific Analysesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A significant amount of evidence suggests that in humans, the scores obtained in different cognitive tests correlate with each other, so that a global factor, called “g” for general intelligence, accounts for an important part of total variance (at least 40 percent, Deary et al, 2010). This suggests that cognitive abilities are not totally independent of each other, sharing (at least partly) a common mechanism (e.g., Ebisch et al, 2012 but see also Rabaglia et al, 2011). In fact, more and more evidence indicates that general cognitive abilities originate from a network of interconnected cortical areas (Deary et al, 2010).…”
Section: Intra-specific Analysesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The brain is a complex nexus of hubs and networks with no single part generally identifiable as the “center of x ” (Sporns, 2013; Uttal, 2015). The mind is likewise divided (Van Orden & Paap, 1997): Godfrey Thomson formulated a distributed processing model of intellectual ability a century ago (Bartholomew, Deary, & Lawn, 2009), echoed in recent discussions of the “positive manifold” (Anderson, 2010; Van Der Maas et al, 2006) and “neural reuse” (Rabaglia, Marcus, & Lane, 2011). For those with intellectual disabilities, the positive manifold is an imperfect one of subtle distributed inefficiencies.…”
Section: Distributed Systemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is, however, the argument from the ‘positive manifold’: the fact that individual differences in cognitive ability tend to be positively correlated across domains, suggesting the existence of a domain‐general factor underlying intelligence (e.g., Spearman's g ) of the sort that massive modularity would seem to preclude. In reply to this argument, post‐Fodorian modularity theorists note that functionally specialized mechanisms are likely to share parts, and that the observed correlations in task performance within individuals and across domains may derive from this overlap . Hence, the existence of the positive manifold does little to undermine the idea of modularity in high‐level cognition.…”
Section: The Case Against Modularitymentioning
confidence: 99%