What Do We Know About the Demand for Evaluation? Insights From the Parliamentary Arena

Bundi, Pirmin

doi:10.1177/1098214015621788

Cited by 21 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 61 publications

(74 reference statements)

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“…Finally, we will reconstruct the analysis of Bundi (2016) that investigates the determinants for the MPs' demand for evaluations (Table 5). In doing so, we compare the findings for the reported evaluation demand (Model 6) and the validated evaluation demand (Model 7).…”

Section: The Effects Of Self-selection and Misreportingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Selection and Misreporting in Legislative Surveys

Bundi¹,

Varone²,

Gava³

et al. 2016

PSRM

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This article discusses the methodological challenges of legislative surveys. Following an overview of different types of survey biases, the article argues that self-selection and misreporting are the most critical problems for legislative surveys. In order to identify the self-selection and misreporting biases, we compare the answers to a survey from Swiss members of parliament with their observed behavior in the parliament. The empirical analysis shows that the survey sample has a substantial misreporting bias. We conclude that the parliamentarian's attitude towards the survey object is strongly linked to their response. These issues should be addressed to improve the design and quality of legislative surveys. †

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Section: The Effects Of Self-selection and Misreportingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Selection and Misreporting in Legislative Surveys

Bundi¹,

Varone²,

Gava³

et al. 2016

PSRM

Self Cite

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“…Steering and accountability relationships can vary widely: between government and citizen, between donor and recipient, and between central and local governments. Evaluations that are set up for accountability reasons provide information to allow decisions on program continuation, expansion, reduction or termination (Bundi 2016(Bundi , 2018. Evaluations, from this angle, can also serve an important outward-facing function.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The question is, however, how these purposes square with politics itself. While there is some evidence on evaluation demand by parliamentarians (Speer et al 2015;Bundi 2016), there is little knowledge on how government ministers conceive of the evaluation function and how they present the rationale of evaluations. Does this rationale differ across policy fields?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…How do politicians view the evaluation function and can we observe certain trends in this regard? As mentioned above, apart from evidence on evaluation demand in the parliamentary arena (Speer et al 2015;Bundi 2016), there is no such research focusing on government ministers. In our study, we particularly analyse the influence of macro-(New Public Management; EU dynamics) and mesolevel variables (policy field) on evaluation demand.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Warum initiieren Minister Evaluationen? Eine Fallstudie der flämischen Regierung in Belgien

Pattyn¹,

Peuter

Brans³

2019

Polit Vierteljahresschr

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Policy evaluations can be set up for multiple purposes including accountability, policy learning and policy planning. The question is, however, how these purposes square with politics itself. To date, there is little knowledge on how government ministers present the rationale of evaluations. This article is the first to provide a diachronic study of discourse about evaluation purposes and encompass a wide range of policy fields. We present an analysis of evaluation announcements in so-called ministerial policy notes issued between 1999 and 2019 by the Flemish government in Belgium. The research fine-tunes available evidence on catalysts for conducting evaluations. The Flemish public sector turns out to be a strong case where New Public Management brought policy evaluation onto the agenda, but this has not resulted in a prominent focus on accountability-oriented evaluations. We further show that policy fields display different evaluation cultures, albeit more in terms of the volume of evaluation demand than in terms of preferences for particular evaluation purposes.

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“…questions, interpellations, motions) to initiate an evaluation, to monitor an evaluation process and to ask about concrete evaluation findings. In addition, MPs directly use the knowledge provided to improve their own decision-making and to hold government to accountable (Jacob et al 2015;Speer et al 2015;Bundi 2016;Zwaan et al 2016). Previous research delivered three findings on the factors explaining why an MP will demand or use a policy evaluation report.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy evaluation in parliament: interest groups as catalysts

Varone

Bundi

Gava

2018

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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Members of Parliament (MPs) request policy evaluations and use the resultant findings to inform law-making and hold the government to account. Since most elected representatives have developed strong ties to interest groups, one might wonder whether these privileged relationships influence MPs' parliamentary behavior. This study investigates how MPs' affiliations to groups affects their demand for policy evaluations. Empirical evidence shows that, regardless of respective party or individual characteristics, MPs are more likely to request evaluations in those policy domains where they have a group affiliation. This effect holds even when controlling for a classical measure of MP policy specialization, such as legislative committee membership. These findings suggest that ties between MPs and specific types of interest group should be considered when explaining parliamentary behavior across different policy domains. Point for practitioners: To influence the policymaking process, interest groups participate in consultation procedures and parliamentary hearings, they lobby elected officials and deliver policy expertise to decision-makers. These advocacy strategies are well studied. This article innovates by showing that, in addition, interest groups foster 3 the development of policy evaluations. MPs affiliated to an interest group active on a specific issue are likely to request policy evaluations in that policy domain. Interest groups strengthen the parliamentary demand for evaluation studies and, thus, may potentially contribute to the accountability of government and public administration.

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What Do We Know About the Demand for Evaluation? Insights From the Parliamentary Arena

Cited by 21 publications

References 61 publications

Self-Selection and Misreporting in Legislative Surveys

Self-Selection and Misreporting in Legislative Surveys

Warum initiieren Minister Evaluationen? Eine Fallstudie der flämischen Regierung in Belgien

Policy evaluation in parliament: interest groups as catalysts

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