What Does Belief Have to Do with Truth?

Abstract

I argue that the widely-held view that belief aims at the truth is false. I acknowledge that there is an important connection between truth and belief but propose a new way of interpreting that connection. On the account I put forth, evidence of truth constrains belief without furnishing an aim for belief.

Embodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy

“…One of the anonymous reviewers pointed out, and we agree, that, for example, the account of the rationality of belief put forward byFileva (2018) may justify the rationality of knowledge avoidance as well. On her view, the belief of the agent who engages in knowledge avoidance is consistent with the agent's evidence, so it does not violate evidential constraints, and so is at least minimally rational or rationally permissible even if it is not rationally ideal.…”