Keywords: Open Marxism; human social practice; production; human needs I am happy to acknowledge that my critique of Open Marxism was not too sympathetic (Bruff 2009). Nevertheless, the discussion was lengthy, detailed and full of citations. Hence my hope that, in contrast to previous responses to criticism, I would coax some self-reflection out of those of an Open Marxist persuasion (in the same way that Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton (2003) carefully considered the Open Marxist critique of neo-Gramscian International Political Economy (IPE)). For this reason I find Werner Bonefeld's (2009) response disappointing.
AssertionsBonefeld barely acknowledges my discussion of Open Marxism; instead, we are informed in a couple of sentences that he finds it puzzling and that I am unclear. The subsequent (and swift) move to critique the alternative framework I sketched in the article's conclusion signals an unwillingness to engage seriously with criticism. What we have instead is simple assertion, an approach that is replicated when articulating the critical points about my position. In consequence, it seems thatunless a new generation of Open Marxist scholars emerges with a more moderate view of other strands of historical materialism-there is little potential for further dialogue. Moreover, as I will now demonstrate, the criticisms that Bonefeld makes are, as can be expected given the prior shunning of constructive engagement, wide of the mark.
ConflationsAs someone who is evidently comfortable with often esoteric discussions of abstraction, it is surprising to see how Bonefeld critiques my position. In particular, he repeatedly conflates transhistorical aspects of human social practice with human social practice in all of its complexity and richness. This is a serious error, because I made it clear that 'the need to produce is essential to our existence; the way in which such production is organised is not ... Therefore, the "how" of production is not a functional response to the "what" of production' (Bruff 2009, 346-347). Nevertheless, through this elision Bonefeld is able then to posit that I adhere to 'a historical materialism based on the natural sciences' (Bonefeld 2009, 356). This is unwarranted given my attempts to show how 'human social practice is constituted by a plurality of social relations, even if such relations are oriented towards our conditions of existence and thus the need to produce' (Bruff 2009, 346).