What Future for the Global Environment Facility?

Clémençon, Raymond

doi:10.1177/1070496506286438

Cited by 36 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Conversely, we expect that governments will prefer to lower implementation costs when designing projects that generate global public goods. Since projects for global public goods only generate national benefits as a side product -for example, Clémençon (2006) shows that climate projects generate private investment in renewable energy, thus improving energy access and security -the national government's interest in the project is at least somewhat smaller than in the case of projects that primarily focus on national public goods. We summarize these expectations in our third hypothesis.…”

Section: Testable Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The UNDP, in contrast, required only twenty percent. In recent years, co-financing requirements have increased at both agencies, reflecting changes to GEF allocation rules and the increased prominence of climate mitigation projects in the energy sector that often draw private capital (Clémençon 2006;Bayer, Marcoux, and Urpelainen 2013). However, as recently as 2011 there remained a substantial gap between the two.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Choosing international organizations: When do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

While international cooperation research emphasizes institutional design, states mostly interact with existing organizations. How do states choose organizations for cooperation? We develop a theory of agency choice for development projects, emphasizing the importance of domestic institutions, the scope of cooperation, and the resources of the implementing agency. If states are to cooperate with funding agencies that have abundant resources, such as the World Bank, they must accept more stringent conditions on project implementation. We argue states accept the stringent conditions that resourceful organizations demand if the public goods from project implementation are highly valuable. Empirically, this is the case for democratic states, large projects, and projects that produce national instead of global public goods. We test this theory using data on 2,882 Global Environment Facility (GEF) projects, 1991-2011. The GEF offers an ideal case because various implementing agencies are responsible for the actual projects. States implement projects in collaboration with the World Bank, which has the most expertise and resources among the GEF's implementing agencies, if their regime type is democracy, the project size is large, and the benefits are primarily national. Qualitative evidence sheds light on causal mechanisms.

show abstract

Section: Testable Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Choosing international organizations: When do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The Global Environmental Facility, the Clean Development Mechanism, the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources, the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, etc., have transfer mechanisms set up. Their coverage and performance are mostly far below announced levels [7,49]. Ad hoc repairs (see the frequent CDM rule changes in 2010) are permanently under way showcasing the deficiency of the mechanisms.…”

Section: Transfers For Climate Change Mitigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Turbo Drive for the Global Reduction of Energy-Related CO2 Emissions

Verbruggen

2011

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:The Copenhagen Accord performed a seizure in the COP ungainly crawl. The Accord's urgent combat against climate change and deep cuts in emissions require a policy reversal, ending the zero sum games on pledged caps, creating clarity on immediate marching directions and eliciting worldwide action by today's operational institutes at all levels. For reducing energy-related CO 2 emissions, all turbo drive components are available. First the global 2 °C ceiling needs translation into, by country, marching directions and indicative future paths of their national average CO 2 emissions per person. The latter intensity indicator is the product of three driving intensities: wealth per person, energy used for wealth production, and CO 2 emissions of energy use, all observed annually for virtually all countries in the world. Second, parties should commit to nearby year improvements on the three driving intensities. Third, transfers from rich to poor countries depend on ability to pay and on ability to spend, and on countries' mitigation progress. The approach dissolves main barriers to mitigation progress, like: outdated emissions baselines; illusory global instruments; bureaucratic MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification) concepts; blocked graduation of parties; unclear transfer mechanisms. In revamping the jammed COP rituals, UNFCCC now leaves operations to established global institutes and mainly to the parties acting in common resolve, stimulated and verified by a lightweight, transparent global framework.

show abstract

“…Multilateral cooperation has produced many benefits by developing shared understanding of the problems, promoting capacity building in developing countries and by funding important and innovative project and program work around the world targeting global environmental problems (GEF, 2013;Clémençon, 2006). As such it is laying important and necessary ground work but it cannot make up for a lack of domestic action in key countries.…”

Section: What To Expect From International Negotiations and Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

http://www.ecsdev.org/ojs/index.php/ejsd/article/view/309/301

2016

EJSD

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:The pressure on EU countries to abandon a leadership role on sustainable development and climate change politics is growing. However, no other source of global leadership is emerging that could fill the gap. The present analysis examines the relative role of four political drivers that influence policy and governance responses to global environmental issues. The conclusion is that over the last two decades, international negotiations, civil society activism, and private sector initiatives on their own have not been decisive factors shaping outcomes while political opportunity structures in key countries explain broad policy trajectories that favor or undermine sustainable development policies. EU countries -where Green Parties at times have been able to critically shape policy direction -are the only actors that have developed the long-term socio-political and economic foundation for a coherent approach to sustainable development. Such a structural foundation on the other hand is missing in the United States and in key emerging economies. This means the EU must continue to lead because without it there will be no coherent political leadership on global environmental issues.

show abstract

What Future for the Global Environment Facility?

Cited by 36 publications

References 9 publications

Choosing international organizations: When do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?

Choosing international organizations: When do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?

A Turbo Drive for the Global Reduction of Energy-Related CO2 Emissions

http://www.ecsdev.org/ojs/index.php/ejsd/article/view/309/301

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About