What is Asian security architecture?

Abstract

Abstract‘Architecture’ has emerged as the new catchphrase in Asian security politics. Despite its growing centrality, insufficient attention has thus far been given to defining the term, often leading to its imprecise usage. This article seeks to redress that shortcoming. It reviews the ways in which various scholars and practitioners have employed the term ‘security architecture’ and highlights the anomalies that their often differing employment has created. The article proposes a set of guidelines to aid conceptualisation and application of the term. In so doing it establishes criteria to ascertain what ‘security architecture’ actually exists in the Asian region, and must ultimately exist to assure regional security.

Invasion by invitation: the role of alliances in the Asia-Pacific

“…It has been usefully pointed out that the phrase 'security architecture' is not always as illuminating as it might be (Tow and Taylor 2010). As I shall explain presently, the Asia-Pacific region has been famously distinguished by the so-called 'hub-and-spokes' alliance relationships that the USA established in the aftermath of World War II.…”

Asian Multilateralism in the Age of Japan's ‘New Normal’: Perils and Prospects

“…It has been described variously as a 'complex' , an 'ecosystem' , and/or a 'patchwork' of institutional arrangements (Cha, 2011;Haggard, 2013;Pempel, 2010). Endowed with neither grand architectural nor strategic coherence (Tow and Taylor, 2010), the regional 'house' that Japan and other regional stakeholders have built, most of which is centered upon ASEAN, is far from the finished article (Tan, 2009). That said, the bits and pieces of its still evolving architecture -one analyst has identified at least five distinct institutional complexes within the Asian region, each with its own ensemble of arrangements (Haggard, 2013) -have been added in an ad hoc and pragmatic fashion in response to specific historical challenges and crises, and as such have their own contingent rationale.…”

Towards Asian regional functional futures: bringing Mitrany back in?

“…This historical legacy poses two major difficulties. First, the majority of governments are outsiders in the region's main (bilateral) security arrangements, which has led the Chinese and Southeast Asian governments to instead place priority on multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (Tow and Taylor 2010). Second, China perceives the US alliance system as not only exclusionary but potentially threatening, and has engaged in a range of balancing strategies (both 'soft' and 'hard') against US regional influence.…”