What is computation?

Copeland, B. Jack

doi:10.1007/bf00413693

Cited by 170 publications

(99 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…I maintain that this presupposition is unjustified, for digital computation Manipulation, Physical Symbol Systems), but others need not be (cf. Copeland 1996, Chalmers 1995, Piccinini 2007. This simply reinforces the need to commit to a particular account of computation.…”

Section: Avoiding Ambiguity About Concrete Digital Computationmentioning

confidence: 75%

“…91-92;: p. 610) account implies that for a system to perform digital computation it needs to execute an algorithm where its output and final state are a causal outcome of its input and 20 initial state. Copeland's (1996) account introduces further requirements: the existence of the right labelling scheme as well as a formal description of that system, and an "honest" model that binds them together.…”

Section: The Algorithm Execution Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the spirit of Turing, Copeland (1997: p. 696) defines an algorithm as "any collection of rules or instructions that determines the behavior of a computing machine". He introduces the existence of a labelling scheme and the honest model requirements to successfully block absurd consequences that follow from trivialising the notion of digital computation (Copeland 1996).…”

Section: Concrete Digital Computation Is Far From Being Trivialmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Concrete Digital Computation: What Does it Take for a Physical System to Compute?

Fresco

2011

J of Log Lang and Inf

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This paper deals with the question: what are the key requirements for a physical system to perform digital computation? Time and again cognitive scientists are quick to employ the notion of computation simpliciter when asserting basically that cognitive activities are computational. They employ this notion as if there was or is a consensus on just what it takes for a physical system to perform computation, and in particular digital computation. Some cognitive scientists in referring to digital computation simply adhere to Turing's notion of computability. Classical computability theory studies what functions on the natural numbers are computable and what mathematical problems are undecidable. Whilst a mathematical formalism of computability may perform a methodological function of evaluating computational theories of certain cognitive capacities, concrete computation in physical systems seems to be required for explaining cognition as an embodied phenomenon. There are many non-equivalent accounts of digital computation in physical systems. I examine only a handful of those in this paper: (1) Turing's account; (2) The triviality "account"; (3) Reconstructing Smith's account of participatory computation; (4) The Algorithm Execution account. My goal in this paper is twofold. First, it is to identify and clarify some of the underlying key requirements mandated by these accounts. I argue that these differing requirements justify a demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the notion of computation in regard to physical systems. Second, it is to argue that despite the informative role that mathematical formalisms of computability may play in cognitive science, they do not specify the relationship between abstract and concrete computation. There are many non-equivalent accounts of digital computation in physical systems. I examine only a handful of those in this paper: 1. Turing's account; 2. The triviality "account"; 3. Reconstructing Smith's account of participatory computation; 4. The Algorithm Execution account. My goal in this paper is twofold. First, it is to identify and clarify some of the underlying key requirements mandated by these accounts. I argue that these differing requirements justify a demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the notion of computation in regard to physical systems. Second, it is to argue that despite the informative role that mathematical formalisms of computability may play in cognitive

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Section: Avoiding Ambiguity About Concrete Digital Computationmentioning

confidence: 75%

Section: The Algorithm Execution Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Concrete Digital Computation Is Far From Being Trivialmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Concrete Digital Computation: What Does it Take for a Physical System to Compute?

Fresco

2011

J of Log Lang and Inf

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“…the reconstruction of Smith's participatory account in Fresco forthcoming as well as the FSM and PSS accounts discussed above), but others need not be (cf. Copeland 1996, Chalmers 1994, the Mechanistic account discussed above). This simply reinforces the need to commit to a particular account of computation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…This is all well and good. Still, as I have argued above, concrete computation (but perhaps not cognitive computation) could be explained without necessarily invoking any representational properties (e.g., by the Mechanistic account above or the Algorithm Execution account in Copeland 1996). If one wishes to commit to a representational account of digital computation, since cognition is representational, one should firstly justify why computation proper is representational.…”

Section: Universal Tmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Critical Survey of Some Competing Accounts of Concrete Digital Computation

Fresco

2013

Algorithmic Probability and Friends. Bayesian Prediction and Artificial Intelligence

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This paper deals with the question: what are the key requirements for a physical system to perform digital computation? Oftentimes, cognitive scientists are quick to employ the notion of computation simpliciter when asserting basically that cognitive activities are computational. They employ this notion as if there is a consensus on just what it takes for a physical system to compute. Some cognitive scientists in referring to digital computation simply adhere to Turing computability. But if cognition is indeed computational, then it is concrete computation that is required for explaining cognition as an embodied phenomenon. Three accounts of computation are examined here: 1. Formal Symbol Manipulation. 2. Physical Symbol Systems and 3.The Mechanistic account. I argue that the differing requirements implied by these accounts justify the demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the notion of digital computation in regard to physical systems, rather than use these accounts interchangeably. Abstract. This paper deals with the question: what are the key requirements for a physical system to perform digital computation? Oftentimes, cognitive scientists are quick to employ the notion of computation simpliciter when asserting basically that cognitive activities are computational. They employ this notion as if there is a consensus on just what it takes for a physical system to compute. Some cognitive scientists in referring to digital computation simply adhere to Turing computability. But if cognition is indeed computational, then it is concrete computation that is required for explaining cognition as an embodied phenomenon. Three accounts of computation are examined here: 1. Formal Symbol Manipulation. 2. Physical Symbol Systems and 3. The Mechanistic account. I argue that the differing requirements implied by these accounts justify the demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the notion of digital computation in regard to physical systems, rather than use these accounts interchangeably.

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Computation, Philosophical Issues about

Scheutz

2006

Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science

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What is computation?

Cited by 170 publications

References 17 publications

Concrete Digital Computation: What Does it Take for a Physical System to Compute?

Concrete Digital Computation: What Does it Take for a Physical System to Compute?

A Critical Survey of Some Competing Accounts of Concrete Digital Computation

Computation, Philosophical Issues about

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