What is rebel governance? Introducing a new dataset on rebel institutions, 1945–2012

Abstract

In the course of civil war, it is not unusual for armed rebels, who are fighting to either take control of a state or create a new one, to create state-like governing institutions. For example, nearly 64% of rebels between 1945 and 2012 created at least one governing institution. One challenge to moving the literature on rebel governance forward is getting data on the many possible institutions that comprise rebel governance. I introduce new data, the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset, which covers 235 rebel groups and codes annually for 25 institutions during the entire existence of the group. I demonstrate the usefulness of this new dataset by exploring a relationship important to scholars: that of rebel strength and rebel governance institutions ( Stewart, 2020 ). These analyses show two things. First, there is value in disaggregating rebel governance and looking at institutions separately because not all governance institutions are correlated with strength in the same direction. Second, taking into account the time dimension is important. Since rebel conventional capability increased as a result of the end of the Cold War (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010) and rebel institutions became more prevalent, there is an important time component to rebel governance that correlates with events in the international system.

Rebel institutions and negotiated peace

“…2. There is mixed evidence as to whether or not rebel governance positively correlates with rebel military strength as measured by the Non-state Actors dataset (Stewart 2020;Albert 2022). Both authors recognize that the relationship between rebel governance and military strength is complex, and Albert (2022) shows that this relationship can vary depending on which institutions are being studied.…”

“…There are two main datasets I used to conduct the analyses here. First, for data on rebel service institutions I used the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset (Albert 2022). This dataset provided the most extensive time-series coverage of service institution variables for the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) rebel groups.…”

When rebels govern oil

“…Rebels groups claim ownership of oil and other resources less frequently than they choose to resort to black marketeering. But those rebel groups that do aver normative claims to resources are often the most institutionally robust and politically durable (Albert, 2022). Such ownership claims, though unusual, are demand further…”

“…Illicit oil governance emerges when rebels have physical possession of resources without making any legal claims to ownership. More rebels seize and smuggle resources than aver legal claims to own these goods (Albert, 2022). In tacitly conceded that their goods are stolen, rebels moot the question of the spatial scope of their authority.…”

The Political Legacies of Rebel Rule: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Côte d’Ivoire

“…First, we add to the literature on rebel governance. While past studies on rebel control of civilians are empirically rich, the literature on the individual-level legacies of rebel rule remains embryonic (but see Bakke et al, 2014; Huang, 2016; Kubota, 2017; 2018; Albert, 2020). This study leverages a rare natural experiment that sheds light on the political consequences of insurgent control of civilians.…”