What is Said?

Schoubye, Anders J.; Stokke, Andreas

doi:10.1111/nous.12133

Cited by 37 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Many recently proposed definitions of lying are similar in this respect: they require lies to be said 2 Stokke's understanding of what is said is presented in Stokke (2016) and in Schoubye & Stokke (2016). 3 See Grice (1975) on the notion of a conversational implicature.…”

Section: Version Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation

Viebahn¹,

Wiegmann²,

Engelmann³

et al. 2018

Preprint

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Can a question be a lie? Theorists in the debate on how to define lying tend to answer this question negatively. They hold that questions can be misleading, but that they cannot be lies. The aim of this paper is to show that ordinary speakers disagree. With the help of three experiments, we show that ordinary speakers judge certain insincere questions to be lies. These judgements are robust and remain so when the participants are given the possibility of classifying the questions as misleading or deceiving without being a lie. Judgments about insincere questions pattern with judgements participants make about declarative lies. And they contrast with judgements participants give about prototypical cases of misleading or deceptive behaviour.

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Section: Version Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation

Viebahn¹,

Wiegmann²,

Engelmann³

et al. 2018

Preprint

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“…She considers two types of cases: on the one hand, metaphors, and on the other hand, Stalnaker's (2002) version of Donnellan's (1966) classic example in which someone uses ''the man drinking a martini'' to communicate something true about someone known not to be drinking a martini: the definition […] wrongly counts both of these cases-where speakers are developing a metaphor, or going along with something they know to be false 1 I defend a detailed theory of what is said, in this sense, in Stokke (2016), Schoubye and Stokke (2015).…”

Section: Keiser's Objectionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Metaphors and Martinis: a response to Jessica Keiser

Stokke

2016

Philos Stud

Self Cite

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This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both these claims are false.

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“…On Asher's account the denotation of a loosely interpreted predicate doesn't change but rather there is a loosening of the predication relation to the effect that "stone lions aren't strictly speaking lions, but they are closer to lions on the relevant metric (here shape) than any of the alternatives suggested by lion"(Asher 2011, p. 308). 20 This property is the basis for the law of non-contradiction.21 For a similar point on the context-sensitivity of negations seeSchoubye and Stokke (2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

The Occasion-Sensitivity of Thought

Dobler

2017

Topoi

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On the most common interpretation of occasion-sensitivity what varies cross-contextually is the truth-conditional content of representations. Jerry Fodor argues that when extended to mental representation this view has some problematic consequences. In this paper I outline an approach to occasion-sensitivity which circumvents Fodor's objections but still maintains that the aspect of thought that guides deliberation and action is occasion-sensitive. On the proposed view, what varies cross-contextually are not truth conditions but rather the conditions for accepting a (true) representation as true relative to a practical goal that is pursued on an occasion. I show that although the proposal entails an error theory this theory is not problematic since it is meant to compensate for the over-generating nature of semantic competence, namely, the fact that not all of the representation's truth-makers are conducive to a given contextually salient goal.

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What is Said?

Cited by 37 publications

References 47 publications

Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation

Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation

Metaphors and Martinis: a response to Jessica Keiser

The Occasion-Sensitivity of Thought

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