What is structural realism?

Realistic Claims in Logical Empiricism

“…The invariantist argument delivered by Kaila, on the other hand, is more promising. The finally effected fusion of logical empiricist (principle of testability) and structural realist (principle of invariance) components has the potential to 16 stake out a middle path between so-called 'epistemic' structural realism and so-called 'ontic' structural realism (for the details of this distinction, see Ladyman 1998). The principle implications of the resulting variant of a 'metrological' structural realism have been indicated elsewhere (see Neuber 2012, esp.…”

Newman’s Objection and the No Miracles Argument

“…7 It has been argued that, by being isomorphic to this wordly structure, models are best able to represent the metaphysical picture of OSR. 8 Despite the potential advantages of the models approach, I focus on the Ramsey approach in the discussion ahead. This will allow me to more easily engage with the recent literature on Newman's Objection, which has focused on the Ramsey approach.…”

“…It is worth emphasizing, however, that the solution I present should be available to any structural realist who accepts the NMA, not just those who use Ramsey sentences. 9 3 See, e.g., Ladyman (1998). 4 See Frigg & Votsis (2011, sections 2 and 3.4.2) for discussion.…”

Quantization as a Guide to Ontic Structure

“…Ontic structural realism (OSR) (Ladyman 1998;French and Ladyman 2003;Ladyman and Ross 2007) is in part motivated by two arguments towards the underdetermination of the ontology associated with traditional realist descriptions of science. 1 The first is formulation underdetermination, and springs from the multiplicity of empirically equivalent formulations of a given theory (Jones 1991;Bain 2009;French 2011).…”

“…1 The first is formulation underdetermination, and springs from the multiplicity of empirically equivalent formulations of a given theory (Jones 1991;Bain 2009;French 2011). The second is pessimistic meta-induction, and springs from the historical superseding of one empirically well-confirmed theory by another (Laudan 1981;Worrall 1989;Ladyman 1998). Under OSR the ontology of a physical theory is constituted by mathematical structures rather than objects and entities.…”