What it is like to be a bit: An Integrated Information Decomposition account of emergent mental phenomena

Abstract

A central question in neuroscience concerns the relationship between consciousness and its physical substrate. Here, we argue that a richer characterisation of consciousness can be obtained by viewing it not as a monolithic construct, but rather as constituted of distinct information-theoretic elements. In other words, we propose a shift from quantification of consciousness - viewed as integrated information - to its decomposition. Through this approach, termed Integrated Information Decomposition (ΦID), we lay out a formal argument that whether the consciousness of a given system is an emergent phenomenon depends on its information-theoretic composition - thus providing a principled answer to the long-standing dispute on the relationship between consciousness and emergence. Furthermore, we show that two organisms may attain the same amount of integrated information, yet differ in its information-theoretic composition. Building on ΦID’s revised understanding of integrated information, termed ΦR, we also introduce the notion of ΦR-ing rate to quantify how efficiently an entity uses information for conscious processing. A combination of ΦR and ΦR-ing rate may provide an important way to compare the neural basis of different aspects of consciousness. Thus, decomposition of consciousness enables us to identify qualitatively different ‘modes of consciousness,’ which establish a common space for mapping the phenomenology of different conscious states. We outline both theoretical and empirical avenues to carry out such mapping between phenomenology and information-theoretic modes, starting from a central feature of everyday consciousness: selfhood. Overall, Integrated Information Decomposition yields rich new ways to explore the relationship between information, consciousness, and its emergence from neural dynamics.

Fluctuations in Neural Complexity During Wakefulness Relate To Conscious Level and Cognition

“…For instance, it is not clear how LZ (and its variants) map onto elements of candidate theories of consciousness, such as the differentiation or integration components of IIT 1 – or, for that matter, whether the different measures proposed historically by IIT can in fact meaningfully assess integration and differentiation in brain dynamics, 30,31 and how these relate to cognition. 32 Therefore, we need better theories to fully interpret these results and incorporate them into a broader picture of consciousness as a neurobiological phenomenon. In this sense, we see these results as a more challenging testbed for upcoming theories of consciousness, that are willing to go beyond gross changes in conscious level (such as between wakefulness and sleep or coma) and able to explain these subtle fluctuations of consciousness during wakefulness.…”

“…assess integration and differentiation in brain dynamics, 30,31 and how these relate to cognition. 32 Therefore, we need better theories to fully interpret these results and incorporate them into a broader picture of consciousness as a neurobiological phenomenon. In this sense, we see these results as a more challenging testbed for upcoming theories of consciousness, that are willing to go beyond gross changes in conscious level (such as between wakefulness and sleep or coma) and able to explain these subtle fluctuations of consciousness during wakefulness.…”

Greater than the parts: a review of the information decomposition approach to causal emergence

“…For more details about the interpretation of each of the normalΦID atoms, and their generalization to more than two time series, we refer the reader to refs. [27,28] (see figure 1).…”

Greater than the parts: A review of the information decomposition approach to causal emergence

“…Interestingly, analysis of fMRI data showed that loss of consciousness due to brain injury corresponds to a reduction of integrated information and causal emergence in the brain [34]. In this way, the more nuanced view on neural information dynamics offered by ΦID offers the promise of further insights for our understanding of consciousness as an emergent phenomenon [27].…”

“…For more details about the interpretation of each of the ΦID atoms, and their generalisation to more than two time series, we refer the reader to Refs. [26,27].…”