What Killed Vote Buying in Britain and the United States?

Stokes, Susan C.; Dunning, Thad; Nazareno, Marcelo; Brusco, Valeria

doi:10.1017/cbo9781107324909.009

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Similarly, it may be possible to increase participation by providing benefits (see Panagopoulos 2013: 267, 270-271). Indeed, in the past political parties and other organisations gave benefits, such as cash, food, alcohol, health care and poverty relief, to voters to encourage them to turn out (see Stokes et al 2012). There have been some recent interventions carried out by companies and charities.…”

Section: Voter Mobilization and Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Targeting voter registration with incentives: A randomized controlled trial of a lottery in a London borough

John

MacDonald²,

Sanders

2015

Electoral Studies

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Does an incentive-in the form of a lottery-increase voter registration, particularly among poorer members of society? In the summer of 2012, two groups of 20,000 randomly selected households from a London Borough were informed that they would be placed into a prize draw if they registered to vote by 28 September 2012. One group was offered £5,000 and the other £1,000while the remaining households in the borough received the standard letter with the same deadline but no lottery offer. The registration rates after the deadline were 46.2 per cent in the £1,000 group and 46.6 per cent in the £1,000 group compared to 44.7 in the control. Levels of registration in the two treatment groups are statistically different to the control, but not from each other.Households in poorer locations are more receptive of the lottery offer whereas there is no effect in places where richer households live. After the face-to-face canvass of all remaining non-registered households, which took place after the experiment, there were no statistically significant differences between the treatment groups and the control. The study builds on the work of Raja and Schaffner (2012) and Panagopoulos (2013) by finding that incentives work in different ways depending on their level and who is targeted.

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Section: Voter Mobilization and Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Targeting voter registration with incentives: A randomized controlled trial of a lottery in a London borough

John

MacDonald²,

Sanders

2015

Electoral Studies

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“…Benedetto and Hix, 2007, for modern work echoing the central point). Connected to such reasoning is a broader literature emphasizing the importance of campaign finance arrangements in a more modern democratic age (Hanham, 1978;Kam, 2009a;Stokes, 2011) and the need to avoid falling into bad odor with a central party administration.…”

Section: Literature and Orientationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Party Cohesion in Westminster Systems: Inducements, Replacement and Discipline in the House of Commons, 1836–1910

Eggers

Spirling²

2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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This article considers the historical development of a characteristic crucial for the functioning and normative appeal of Westminster systems: cohesive legislative parties. It gathers the universe of the 20,000 parliamentary divisions that took place between 1836 and 1910 in the British House of Commons, construct a voting record for every Member of Parliament (MP) serving during this time, and conducts analysis that aims to both describe and explain the development of cohesive party voting. In line with previous work, it shows that – with the exception of a chaotic period in the 1840s and 1850s – median discipline was always high and increased throughout the century. The study uses novel methods to demonstrate that much of the rise in cohesion results from the elimination of a rebellious ‘left tail’ from the 1860s onwards, rather than central tendency shifts. In explaining the aggregate trends, the article uses panel data techniques and notes that there is scant evidence for ‘replacement’ explanations that involve new members behaving in more disciplined ways than those leaving the chamber. It offers evidence that more loyal MPs were more likely to obtain ministerial posts, and speculates that this and other ‘inducement’-based accounts offer more promising explanations of increasingly cohesive parties.

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“…There are three reasons why this is arguably the case. First, the adoption of the secret ballot disrupts vote‐buying efforts by parties and leads them to focus on turnout‐buying instead (Heckelman, ; see also Kam, forthcoming; Stokes, ). Prior to the adoption of the secret ballot, voters could be intimidated or bribed into voting for parties other than their first preferences.…”

Section: The Effect Of the Secret Ballot: Three Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Party System Fragmentation: A Test of Three Competing Arguments

Raymond

2014

Politics

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Few studies have examined the impact that the adoption of the secret ballot had on party system fragmentation outside the United States. This article tests arguments maintaining that the adoption of the secret ballot had a negative, positive or nil effect on party system fragmentation. Using time‐series cross‐sectional data from several countries adopting the secret ballot around the turn of the twentieth century, the results demonstrate that the adoption of the secret ballot did not hinder – though did not favour, either – the development of multiparty systems.

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What Killed Vote Buying in Britain and the United States?

Cited by 7 publications

References 10 publications

Targeting voter registration with incentives: A randomized controlled trial of a lottery in a London borough

Targeting voter registration with incentives: A randomized controlled trial of a lottery in a London borough

Party Cohesion in Westminster Systems: Inducements, Replacement and Discipline in the House of Commons, 1836–1910

The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Party System Fragmentation: A Test of Three Competing Arguments

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