What Makes PACs Tick? An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of Economic Interest Groups

Gopoian, J. David; Smith, Hobart M.; Smith, William

doi:10.2307/2110873

Cited by 146 publications

(86 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…1980Welch ( , 1981Welch ( , 1982, Wright (1985). tl E.g., Bennett and Loucks (1994), Endersby and Munger (1992), Gopoian (1984), Grenzke (1989a,b), Grief and Munger (1986, Grier et al (1990), Jacobson (1980), Kau and Rubin (1993), Kau et al (1982), Palda and Palda (1985), Poole and Romer (1985), Poole et al (1987), Regens et al (1991Regens et al ( , 1994, Romer and Snyder (1994), Silberman and Yochum (1980), Stratmann (1992aStratmann ( ,1994Stratmann ( , 1995a, Wilhite andTheilmann (1986a,b, 1987).…”

Section: The Contribution Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…17 Moreover, several studies indicate that economic interest groups, in particular, tend to give more money to representatives who join important committees, 18 thus providing support for the exchange model. Committees largely 13 See, e.g., Chappell (1982), Gopoian (1984), Grier andMunger (1986, 1991), Keim and Zardkoohi (1988), Poole and Romer (1985), Sahzman (1987), Welch (1980Welch ( , 1982. J4 For instance, these more specific measures obtain swing legislators on a specific issue by considering how the legislator would vote based on her or his constituency interests (Stratmann, 1992a;Welch, 1982), or the measures are based on the correlation between the estimated vote and contributions equation in a simultaneous equations model (Chappell, 1982;Stratmann, 1991).…”

Section: The Contribution Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, Gopoian (1984) finds oil PACs to be more ideologically (support) oriented than defense PACs. Similarly, Clawson and Neustadtl (1988) find the contribution strategy to be more pragmatic (exchange) if there is a high government involvement in the PAC's industry.…”

Section: Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

Potters

Sloof

1996

European Journal of Political Economy

214

113

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Substantial political power is often attributed to interest groups. The origin of this power is not quite clear, though, and the mechanisms by which influence is effectuated are not yet fully understood. The last two decades have yielded a vast number of studies which use empirical models to assess the importance of interest groups for the formation of public policy. Each of these studies yields insights on particular, confined aspects of interest group politics. To get a more complete picture of the results, however, a broad survey of the literature seems useful. It is the purpose of this paper to provide such a survey.JEL classification: D72; D78

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Section: The Contribution Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Contribution Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

Potters

Sloof

1996

European Journal of Political Economy

214

113

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“…Given these statistics, it is not surprising that the scholarly analysis of campaign contributions has seen its most significant increases in the last decade (see, for example, Bennett and Loucks [1994]; Chappell [1981]; Godwin, [1990]; Gopoian [1984]; Munger [1986, 1991]; Grier et al [1990]; Langbein [1993]; Loucks [1996]; Mitchell and Munger [1991]; Munger [1989]; Poole and Romer [1985]; Regens et al [1991]; Romer and Snyder [1994]; Snyder [1990]; Stratman [1991]). It is also not surprising that the popular press and the public seem convinced that special interest groups (via PACs) are buying votes in Congress to further their agendas.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An analysis of PAC contributions and legislator quality

Florence

1999

Atlantic Economic Journal

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“…A third prediction of vote-buying models is that PAC donations, ceteris paribus, should¯ow to elected ocials who are on the margin with respect to the PAC's cause, not to staunch supporters who will cast their vote with the PAC anyway. This prediction is at odds with the data; PACs overwhelmingly give to strong supporters [Gopoian (1984), Poole et al (1987), Grier and Munger (1993)]. Stratmann (1992), however, provides evidence that contributions do tend to go to legislators who are on the fence.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters?

Levitt

1998

Economics & Politics

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Political Action Committees (PACs) can aect public policies in either of two ways: altering legislators' roll-call voting behavior, or in¯uencing election outcomes. This paper develops a dynamic model demonstrating that the relative importance of the election-in¯uencing channel is easily underestimated. A one-time contribution to a candidate who supports the PAC's position that alters an election outcome yields bene®ts to the PAC as long as that candidate holds oce. In contrast, roll-call vote buying is likely to operate on a quid-pro-quo basis, limiting the PAC's return on investment. Empirical tests based on the theoretical model suggest that PACs value the election-in¯uencing aspect of contributions at least as much as the roll-call vote-buying channel.CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS by Political Action Committees (PACs) have increased dramatically in the last twenty years. Donations made by PACs to House races grew from $36 million to $120 million (in constant 1992 dollars) between 1974 and 1992, an increase of over 200% in real terms. PACs now account for over one-third of all campaign contributions in House races, and one-fourth of contributions to Senate candidates.In response to the increasing importance of PACs, a great deal of analysis has been devoted to understanding PAC behavior. There are two primary rationales for PAC donations. First, PACs may hope to aect the course of legislation either by``buying votes'' in Congress [e.g., Snyder (1990)], or by altering legislation at the committee stage [Hall and Wayman (1989)]. A second possible goal of PAC support is to in¯uence election outcomes, either by attracting voters directly via candidate endorsement, or indirectly through campaign contributions that the candidate transforms into votes [Austen-Smith (1987); Baron (1989)].In deciding how to allocate campaign contributions across candidates, PACs, need to take into account three (sometimes contradictory) considerations. If the PAC is attempting to in¯uence legislators' votes, then the PAC wants to contribute to winning candidates, typically incumbents, since losing candidates cannot repay favors to the PAC. PACs also want to give to candidates who are on the margin with respect to the PAC's issues. Legislators who staunchly support or oppose the PAC's position are less likely to alter their position in response to campaign contributions than are marginal congressmen. Finally, to the extent that PACs are attempting to in¯uence election outcomes, they want to concentrate contributions on staunch supporters.

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What Makes PACs Tick? An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of Economic Interest Groups

Cited by 146 publications

References 7 publications

Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

An analysis of PAC contributions and legislator quality

Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters?

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