What They Do Does Matter: Incumbent Resource Allocations and the Individual House Vote

Abstract

It is reasonable to presume that House incumbents through their behaviors and resource allocations (e.g., trips home, staff, etc.) are responsible for their electoral success. The empirical case for the resource allocation hypothesis, however, rests primarily upon the support of a few experimental design studies. The remainder of the evidence from 25 years of tests of this hypothesis, at the district and individual-levels, is littered with null findings. Scholars suggest two methodological obstructions hinder alternative hypothesis findings: simultaneity bias (in district and individuallevel studies), and restricted variance on the allocation measures (in individual-level studies). In this investigation I apply methodological remedies for these hindrances-nonrecursive analyses on a pooled (1960)(1961)(1962)(1963)(1964)(1965)(1966)(1967)(1968)(1969)(1970)(1971)(1972)(1973)(1974)(1975)(1976)) NES elections data set. I uncover the strongest evidence yet that incumbents benefit electorally from their resource allocations (here: bills sponsored and cosponsored, staff, and district offices). In addition to this main result, I also discuss the influence generational replacement has on resource allocations and the vote.Keywords Constituency service AE Incumbent vote AE Incumbency advantage AE Personal vote AE Resource allocations I would like to thank F.S. for data collection, Gary C. Jacobson for sharing his challenger quality data, Richard J. Harris for his methodological assistance, and the Brown Bag Gang for their helpful comments.

The Intuitive Traditionalist

“…Typical explanations for why candidates already in office get more votes are institutional: incumbents have access to more resources (Abramowitz, 1991) and can provide goods and services to constituents in exchange for support (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987;Romero, 2006). They can also take credit for successes, capitalize on polls and publicity (Mayhew, 1974), and learn from experience more generally (Campbell, 2008).…”

The Incumbency Advantage in the US Congress: A Roller-Coaster Relationship

“…Supported by his seminal findings, a large body of future works (e.g. Abramowitz, 1975; Ferejohn, 1977; Fiorina, 1977; Mann and Wolfinger, 1980; Coates, 1995; Cox and Katz, 1996; Herrera and Yawn, 1999) has taken the existence of the incumbency advantage and its growth for granted and shifted the attention to its possible explanations, such as the growth of bureaucracy (Fiorina, 1977), the change in relations between incumbents and constituents (Fenno, 1978; Romero, 2006) or the influence of the media (Prior, 2006).…”

Making a Good Impression: Resource Allocation, Home Styles, and Washington Work

“…Fiorina (1981b) argued that previous election outcomes might influence how much mail members choose to send to their constituents or how many offices they decide to open in the district. In an innovative bit of research, Romero (2006) showed that the simultaneity concerns raised by Fiorina are important and that, once these effects are controlled, the use of official resources has a demonstrably positive effect on the probability that respondents support the incumbent member of Congress. Rejecting the direct-effects approach, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987) argued that the activities of members affect how constituents perceive the members.…”