What Threat? Leadership, Strategic Culture, and Indonesian Foreign Policy in the South China Sea

Abstract

Why is there no balancing behavior in Southeast Asia vis‐à‐vis what many observers see as a “Chinese threat,” especially in the case of Indonesia? Despite all the concerns regarding the stability of the region, Indonesia is neither strengthening its power projection capability nor building a coalition to address China's growing power in the South China Sea. Indonesia's underbalancing behavior is the result of a strategic culture that influences its military and foreign policy thinking on threat perceptions and economic considerations, limiting the options that Indonesia can take vis‐à‐vis China. As a result, China as a state is not seen as a major, direct, and immediate threat that would warrant immediate action that may in turn jeopardize Indonesia's larger interest. Instead, domestic politics and security—especially public perceptions of how the government's friendship with China may benefit or hurt the government—remains the focus and the priority of the government.

Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum: From Hedging to Underbalancing

“…Some scholars have already examined how Indonesia's strategic culture hampered the GMF execution. For example, one author suggested that Indonesia's underbalancing behaviour has been the result of a strategic culture that affects its military and foreign policy thinking on threat perceptions (Sulaiman, 2019). Meanwhile, another researcher noted that due to strategic culture, the Indonesian Navy is not allowed to expand its roles (Arif & Kurniawan, 2017).…”

Indonesia’s China and US Approach: Crafting Policies Out of Standard Operating Procedures

“…Of late, some have employed Schweller's model in understanding Indonesia's response towards major and revisionist powers; or argue that Indonesia is either non-balancing or underbalancing (Laksmana, 2016a(Laksmana, , 2016bSulaiman, 2019;Syailendra, 2017). However, reliable empirical differentiation of whether a state is overbalancing, non-balancing or underbalancing, is often difficult to make, particularly, without the benefit of hindsight.…”

Indonesia’s Foreign and Maritime Policies Under Joko Widodo: Domestic and External Determinants

“…The articles employing neoclassical realism identify systemic/external stimuli that Indonesia currently faces, highlighting the importance of domestic politics in shaping various stakeholders' perception on such stimuli, as well as in influencing their conception of foreign policy goals and national interest (He, 2008;Korolev & Portyakov, 2018;Kuik, 2012;Laksmana, 2016;Lobell et al, 2009, p. 322;Magcamit, 2020;Meibauer, 2020;Rose, 1998;Sari, 2019;Sebastian & Syailendra, 2017;Smith, 2019;Sulaiman, 2019;Syailendra, 2017). 9 Departing from neorealism, which suggests that states placed in a similar position in the international system would behave similarly despite differing domestic structures, neoclassical realists 'seek to explain variation in the foreign policies of the same state over time or across different states facing similar external constraints' (Taliaferro et al, 2009, p. 21).…”

“…Neoclassical realist scholars emphasise that state behaviour is influenced by domestic political situations when adapting to the external environment (Korolev & Portyakov, 2018;Kuik, 2012;Lobell et al, 2009;Magcamit, 2020;Meibauer, 2020;Rose, 1998;Smith, 2019). For an application of neoclassical realism in the study of Indonesia's foreign and security policy, see (He, 2008;Laksmana, 2016;Sari, 2019;Sebastian & Syailendra, 2017;Sulaiman, 2019;Syailendra, 2017).…”