When adversary encounters uncertain cyber-physical systems: Robust zero-dynamics attack with disclosure resources

Park, Gyunghoon; Shim, Hyungbo; Lee, Chanhwa; Eun, Yongsoon; Johansson, Karl Henrik

doi:10.1109/cdc.2016.7799047

Cited by 46 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…So long as the dynamics of x is concerned, adding and subtracting the function (15) to the control u defined in (17), one obtains…”

Section: Proof Of the Main Result: A Change Of Coordinatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, as shown e.g. in [17], in a system whose zero dynamics are unstable, with an (output feedback) control chosen so as to guarantee asymptotic stability in the absence of attacks, an attack generator may inject signals that make the internal state diverge, while the effects of such attack are not visible from the mere observation of the output (on the measure of which the stabilizing control is designed). An attack of this kind is commonly referred to as a zero-dynamics attack.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Robust protection scheme against cyber‐physical attacks in power systems

Giorgio

Pietrabissa

Priscoli

et al. 2018

IET Control Theory & Applications

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This paper presents a robust defence strategy in reaction to destabilizing cyber-physical attacks launched against linear time invariant systems and its application to power systems. The proposed protection scheme aims at making the dynamics of a selected subsystem decoupled from the dynamics of the subsystem targeted by the attack. The standard decoupling methods are made robust, in spite of poor information about plant parameters and lack of state measurement, with the aid of an extended observer. In this way it is possible to keep the protected dynamics arbitrarily close to the one of a suitably chosen stable system, so long as the dynamics being targeted by the attack remain within prescribed bounds. The proposed defence strategy is presented in the context of modern power systems, wherein generators and transmission network are operated by different players, and shown to be effective using the Western System Coordinating Council 9-bus test power network.

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“…So long as the dynamics of x is concerned, adding and subtracting the function (15) to the control u defined in (17), one obtains…”

Section: Proof Of the Main Result: A Change Of Coordinatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust protection scheme against cyber‐physical attacks in power systems

Giorgio

Pietrabissa

Priscoli

et al. 2018

IET Control Theory & Applications

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show abstract

“…Proposition 1: [34] Under the stealthy attack policy consisting of (16) and (17), the states and monitored outputs of the systems (9) and (7) in the presence of attack signal (15) satisfy…”

Section: B Naive Attackermentioning

confidence: 99%

Detectability of Intermittent Zero-Dynamics Attack in Networked Control Systems

Mao

Jafarnejadsani

Zhao

et al. 2019

2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

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This paper analyzes stealthy attacks, particularly the zero-dynamics attack (ZDA) in networked control systems. ZDA hides the attack signal in the null-space of the state-space representation of the control system and hence it cannot be detected via conventional detection methods. A natural defense strategy builds on changing the null-space via switching through a set of topologies. In this paper, we propose a realistic ZDA variation where the attacker is aware of this topology-switching strategy, and hence employs the policy to avoid detection: "pause (update and resume) attack" before (after) topology switching to evade detection. We first systematically study the proposed ZDA variation, and then develop defense strategies under the realistic assumptions. Particularly, we characterize conditions for detectability of the proposed ZDA variation, in terms of the network topologies to be maintained, the set of agents to be monitored, and the measurements of the monitored agents that should be extracted. We provide numerical results that demonstrate our theoretical findings.

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“…We will show that all of these can be done with the input redundancy. It should be pointed out that, unlike the wellknown zero-dynamics attack [7], [10], [11], the proposed attack policy is applicable even when there is no unstable Fig. 1: Sampled-data system connected through network zero (either for continuous-time model or for its sampled-data counterpart).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Masking attack for sampled‐data systems via input redundancy

Kim

Park

Shim

et al. 2019

IET Control Theory & Applications

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In this paper, we introduce a new vulnerability of cyber-physical systems to malicious attack. It arises when the physical plant, that is modeled as a continuous-time LTI system, is controlled by a digital controller. In the sampled-data framework, most anomaly detectors monitor the plant's output only at discrete time instants, and thus, nothing abnormal can be detected as long as the sampled output behaves normal. This implies that if an actuator attack drives the plant's state to pass through the kernel of the output matrix at each sensing time, then the attack compromises the system while remaining stealthy. We show that this type of attack always exists when the sampleddata system has an input redundancy, i.e., the number of inputs being larger than that of the outputs or the sampling rate of the actuators being higher than that of the sensors. Simulation results for the X-38 vehicle and for the other numerical examples illustrate this new attack strategy possibly brings disastrous consequences.

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When adversary encounters uncertain cyber-physical systems: Robust zero-dynamics attack with disclosure resources

Cited by 46 publications

References 13 publications

Robust protection scheme against cyber‐physical attacks in power systems

Robust protection scheme against cyber‐physical attacks in power systems

Detectability of Intermittent Zero-Dynamics Attack in Networked Control Systems

Masking attack for sampled‐data systems via input redundancy

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