When are International Institutions Effective? The Impact of Domestic Veto Players on Compliance with WTO Rulings

Peritz, Lauren

doi:10.1093/isq/sqz094

Cited by 13 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…10 Some case selection models suggest defendants would anticipate this process and avoid trial when cases are strong, though Davis (2012, 88) explains the WTO's lack of retroactive punishment means states use litigation to delay removing non-compliant measures. Some defendants keep noncompliant measures due to domestic political concerns (Peritz 2020). 11 It has also been noted that high levels of distortion increase the likelihood of a violation ruling (Davis 2012, 129).…”

Section: Industry and Firm-level Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Litigation for Sale: Private Firms and WTO Dispute Escalation

BRUTGER

2023

Am Polit Sci Rev

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This article presents a theory of lobbying by firms for trade liberalization, not through political contributions, but instead through contributions to the litigation process at the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this “litigation for sale” model, firms signal information about the strength and value of potential cases and the government selects cases based on firms’ signals. Firms play a key role in monitoring and seeking enforcement of international trade law by signaling information and providing a bureaucratic subsidy, which increases a state’s ability to pursue the removal of trade barriers and helps explain the high success rate for WTO complainants. The theory’s implications are consistent with in-depth interviews with 38 trade experts and are tested through an analysis of WTO dispute initiation.

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Section: Industry and Firm-level Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Litigation for Sale: Private Firms and WTO Dispute Escalation

BRUTGER

2023

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…Others focus on factors that explain compliance with its outcomes or on the legitimacy (and political viability) of the dispute settlement system itself (cf. Brutger & Morse, 2015;Busch & Pelc, 2010;Peritz, 2020). In both cases, findings on the WTO-DSS are often derived from (and compared with) findings from research on international courts in general.…”

Section: A Theory Of the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlemen...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Divergence Across the Atlantic? US Skepticism Meets the EU and the WTO’s Appellate Body

Kerremans

2022

PaG

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In 2019, the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement System (WTO-DSS) lost its quorum. Instead of the required minimum number of three members, the AB’s membership fell to one member only as the US under Donald Trump blocked the appointment of new members upon the expiry of the terms of two incumbent ones. The AB’s paralysis produced a high level of shock in the EU. In this article, we take a closer look at the US’s decision to paralyze the WTO’s AB and the EU’s reaction to it. Its point is that it will not be easy to get the US back on board as the factors that drove its decision predate the Trump era. Long before Trump, the tradeoff upon which the US based its acceptance of the WTO-DSS unraveled. For US policy makers, the EU is partly to blame for this as it undermined the system’s prompt compliance assumption. More important even is the claim that the system’s AB created new obligations for the WTO members to the point where the acceptance of some WTO rules—notably regarding trade remedies—became politically unsustainable in the US itself.

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“…Sejumlah alasan dianalisis, seperti misalnya, keikutsertaan Indonesia dalam berbagai perjanjian perdagangan tersebut adalah untuk mencapai tujuan geo-politik dan geo-ekonomi (Syarip, 2020) atau karena dorongan kepentingan kelompok domestik (Marks, 2015;Rüland, 2016). Sebagian lainnya mendiskusikan dampak dari keikutsertaan negara sedang berkembang dalam berbagai perjanjian perdagangan bagi ekonomi domestik (Arfani & Winanti, 2017;Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2011), maupun analisis atas kapasitas dan kemampuan negara sedang berkembang dalam memenuhi komitmen mereka dalam perjanjian perdagangan internasional (Narayanan & Khorana, 2017;Peritz, 2020;Timossi, 2019). Berangkat dari asumsi bahwa keaktifan Indonesia di berbagai inisiatif perjanjian perdagangan tersebut baru akan memiliki makna jika pemanfaatannya dapat dirasakan langsung oleh para pemangku kepentingan di Indonesia, tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mendiskusikan kesiapan Indonesia dalam merespons perjanjian perdagangan internasional yang diikutinya.…”

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Menakar Kesiapan Indonesia dalam Merespons Perjanjian Perdagangan Internasional

Winanti

2022

Politika

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Stagnasi dalam perundingan perdagangan multilateral di World Trade Organization (WTO) pada dua dekade terakhir, mendorong munculnya inisiatif perundingan di tingkat regional atau bilateral. Indonesia termasuk negara yang aktif terlibat dalam berbagai inisiatif perundingan perdagangan tersebut. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mendiskusikan kesiapan Indonesia merespons perjanjian perdagangan internasional khususnys Indonesia - Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA) dan Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Dengan memanfaatkan perspektif ‘ofensif’ dan ‘defensif’ dalam kebijakan perdagangan, kesiapan Indonesia akan dicermati dari dua sisi kepentingan. Kepentingan ofensif dilihat dari kesiapan untuk memanfaatkan peluang atas kemudahan akses pasar yang tersedia. Kepentingan defensif dianalisis dari kesiapan atas daya saing akibat dari konsekuensi perjanjian yang bersifat timbal balik. Tulisan ini berargumen bahwa pemerintah Indonesia masih kesulitan dalam menangkap peluang kepentingan ofensif karena akses pasar yang tersedia belum dimanfaatkan secara optimal. Besarnya potensi pasar domestik, menjadi salah satu penyebab ekspansi pasar global belum menjadi prioritas pelaku bisnis nasional. Sedangkan dari aspek kepentingan defensif, kemudahan masuknya produk asing perlu dipastikan tidak mematikan produsen dalam negeri akibat tidak memiliki daya saing, namun justru dapat dimaksimalkan agar menjadi pelengkap bagi rantai produksi domestik.

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When are International Institutions Effective? The Impact of Domestic Veto Players on Compliance with WTO Rulings

Cited by 13 publications

References 54 publications

Litigation for Sale: Private Firms and WTO Dispute Escalation

Litigation for Sale: Private Firms and WTO Dispute Escalation

Divergence Across the Atlantic? US Skepticism Meets the EU and the WTO’s Appellate Body

Menakar Kesiapan Indonesia dalam Merespons Perjanjian Perdagangan Internasional

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