When Compromised Readers Meet RFID

Avoine, Gildas; Lauradoux, Cédric; Martin, Tania

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10838-9_4

Cited by 25 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…, (c q , r q ) from the PUF of T and stores them together with ID in database DB, which is later used by verifier V in the authentication protocol. 4 Note that there are papers considering revocation of malicious verifiers (such as in [4,29]). A simple approach to enable verifier revocation in our scheme is moving all computations of V to DB s.t.…”

Section: Protocol Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reverse Fuzzy Extractors: Enabling Lightweight Mutual Authentication for PUF-Enabled RFIDs

Herrewege

Katzenbeisser

Maes

et al. 2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

142

148

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. RFID-based tokens are increasingly used in electronic payment and ticketing systems for mutual authentication of tickets and terminals. These systems typically use cost-effective tokens without expensive hardware protection mechanisms and are exposed to hardware attacks that copy and maliciously modify tokens. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising technology to protect against such attacks by binding security critical data to the physical characteristics of the underlying hardware. However, existing PUF-based authentication schemes for RFID do not support mutual authentication, are often vulnerable to emulation and denial-of service attacks, and allow only for a limited number of authentications. In this paper, we present a new PUF-based authentication scheme that overcomes these drawbacks: it supports PUF-based mutual authentication between tokens and readers, is resistant to emulation attacks, and supports an unlimited number of authentications without requiring the reader to store a large number of PUF challenge/response pairs. In this context, we introduce reverse fuzzy extractors, a new approach to correct noise in PUF responses that allows for extremely lightweight implementations on the token. Our proof-of-concept implementation shows that our scheme is suitable for resource-constrained devices.

show abstract

Section: Protocol Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reverse Fuzzy Extractors: Enabling Lightweight Mutual Authentication for PUF-Enabled RFIDs

Herrewege

Katzenbeisser

Maes

et al. 2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

142

148

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We find that the W0 protocol suffers from tag tracking attack under an assumption of a compromised delegated reader scenario in [18]. The assumption is reasonable.…”

Section: Vulnerabilities In W2 Schemementioning

confidence: 87%

A New Scalable RFID Delegation Protocol

Chen¹,

Cao²,

Guo³

2014

Appl. Math. Inf. Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:The radio frequency identification (RFID) protocols are vulnerable to various attacks from an active or passive adversary. We shed light upon some existing security flaws in these delegation protocols. It is useful to mitigate many security weaknesses in such delegation protocols to promote the acceptance of RFID tags. We propose that a scalable RFID delegation protocol will be against traceability attacks with a stateful variant so that it provides the claimed security requirements. Compared with the previous schemes, we emphasize three critical distinctions in our protocol. First, the reader and the tag decrease one bitwise XOR of the message and reduce the computational complexity. Second, a solution to reducing the maximum search complexity can be that add two different flags to the tags responses in order to distinguish delegation request from delegation update. Third, the number of exchanged flows during different cases of our revision is same. Finally, the proposed scheme achieves scalability and untraceability property without leading to a security collision.

show abstract

“…Indeed, due to these potential risks, the protocols usually use temporarily delegation model such that the delegated reader can identify the tags with a limited number of times and cannot update secrets of the tags. In 2009, Avoine et al introduced the problem of compromised readers [20] and pointed out the possibility and risk of such a situation. Throughout our attacks, we assume that the adversary can initiate communication with the delegated readers and the tags.…”

Section: Assumptions and The Attack Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, we firstly describe an architecture for a basic RFID delegation protocol and then analyze the security of a recent RFID delegation protocol, which we call SMD (Song Mitchell Delegation) due to name of the authors [15] under this model. We point out that the SMD protocol has security weakness under the assumption of a compromised reader scenario which was firstly addressed in [20] and show that the protocol suffers from a tag impersonation attack and a desynchronization attack. Next, we present a serious security flaw by which a delegated entity can still keep its delegation rights although they are ended by the back-end server and this makes the protocol susceptible to the mentioned attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security flaws in a recent RFID delegation protocol

Erguler

Anarım

2011

Pers Ubiquit Comput

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Radio frequency identification (RFID) tag delegation enables a centralized back-end server to delegate the right to identify and authenticate a tag to specified readers. This should be used to mitigate the computational load on the server side and also to solve the issues in terms of latency and dependency on network connectivity. In this study, we describe a basic RFID delegation architecture and then under this model, we investigate the security of an RFID delegation protocol: Song Mitchell delegation (SMD), which is recently proposed by Song and Mitchell. We point out security flaws that have gone unnoticed in the design and present two attacks namely, a tag impersonation attack and a desynchronization attack against it. We also discover a subtle flaw by which a delegated entity can still keep its delegation rights after the expire of them-this infringes security policy of the scheme. More precisely, we show that the protocol will be still vulnerable to previously mentioned attacks, even if the back-end server ends the delegation right of a delegated reader and update the secrets of the delegated tags. To counteract such flaws, we improve the SMD protocol with a stateful variant so that it provides the claimed security properties.

show abstract

When Compromised Readers Meet RFID

Cited by 25 publications

References 11 publications

Reverse Fuzzy Extractors: Enabling Lightweight Mutual Authentication for PUF-Enabled RFIDs

Reverse Fuzzy Extractors: Enabling Lightweight Mutual Authentication for PUF-Enabled RFIDs

A New Scalable RFID Delegation Protocol

Security flaws in a recent RFID delegation protocol

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About