2020
DOI: 10.1111/ajfs.12290
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When Do Foreign Institutional Blockholders Passively Promote Firm Innovation in a Local Market? Evidence from Korea

Abstract: Using extensive hand-collected data on granted patents, we examine the effect of institutional blockholder monitoring on corporate innovation in Korea. Specifically, we focus on the relation between institutional blockholding and firm innovation. We find that institutional blockholders positively influence firm innovation and that this positive effect is driven primarily by foreign institutional blockholders, particularly when they engage in passive monitoring. The Korean market features limited participation … Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 108 publications
(148 reference statements)
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“…Pressure resistant investors follow the active monitoring hypothesis and have more economic incentive to monitor, making it possible for them to keep an eye on firm management (Pound, 1988). Pension funds and mutal funds are considered to be pressure-resistant and in a superior position to oversee firm management since they only have an investment relationship with investee firms (Hutchinson et al, 2015).Moreover, foreign institutional shareholders display the traits of pressure sensitive investors (Nashier & Gupta, 2016;Joe et al, 2020;Panda & Leepsa, 2019). They monitor investee firms more aggressively and demand management decision-making processes be changed in order to increase firm performance (Ferreira & Matos, 2008;Gillan & Starks, 2003).…”
Section: Information Asymmetry Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Pressure resistant investors follow the active monitoring hypothesis and have more economic incentive to monitor, making it possible for them to keep an eye on firm management (Pound, 1988). Pension funds and mutal funds are considered to be pressure-resistant and in a superior position to oversee firm management since they only have an investment relationship with investee firms (Hutchinson et al, 2015).Moreover, foreign institutional shareholders display the traits of pressure sensitive investors (Nashier & Gupta, 2016;Joe et al, 2020;Panda & Leepsa, 2019). They monitor investee firms more aggressively and demand management decision-making processes be changed in order to increase firm performance (Ferreira & Matos, 2008;Gillan & Starks, 2003).…”
Section: Information Asymmetry Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Institutional investors exit when they are dissatisfied with managerial decisions (Mccahery et al., 2016; Joe et al., 2020). Foreign investors may sell shares to express their dissatisfaction with managers’ M&A decisions regarding the ex‐post “exit” channel.…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to the signaling theory, government subsidies, an important source of innovation funds, are very important tools for signal transmission (Peng & Liu, 2018) and can ensure the ongoing innovation activities. A large literature examines the role of political ties (Wang et al, 2022), manager characteristics (Tian et al, 2020; Ting et al, 2021), corporate governance (Joe et al, 2020; Sapra et al, 2014), and external environments (Bai et al, 2022; Zhang, Wu, et al, 2022) in explaining firms' innovation behavior. The research above enriched the literature about the factors impacting firm innovation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%