When Do Imposed Sanctions Work? The Role of Target Regime Type

Abstract

A number of studies on sanction effectiveness have highlighted the importance of regime type and how it affects the sensitivity of sanctioned states (target) to the economic costs of sanctions. The scholarly consensus holds that mainly because of their responsiveness to domestic audiences, democratic regimes are most likely to give in to the demands of the sanctioning state (sender). I argue that regime type is important not only in influencing leaders’ sensitivity to economic costs—which create incentives to back down—but also to the audience costs—which create incentives to stand firm. I argue that taking the audience cost into account would lead to different predictions about the effect of democracy. Particularly, I argue that the effect of democracy is inverted- U shaped, where full democracies have no higher likelihood of meeting the demands of the sender than mixed (hybrid) regimes. Using a newly released dataset on economic sanctions between 1950-2020, I find robust support for my argument.

Audience Costs and the Credibility of Public versus Private Threats in International Crises

“…But to note, the model ofTarar and Leventoglu (2009) also provides a rationale for private communication. They find that, while only one side makes public commitments that side prevails in a crisis and avoids a war, there is a higher likelihood of war when both sides issue public commitments.4 Similarly,Trager (2017) argues that private communication behind closed doors often influences the inferences of diplomats and leaders on adversaries' intentions.5 On the implication of domestic audience costs on the target side, see alsoKurizaki and Whang (2015) andZarpli (2022).…”

In Search of Audience Costs in International Relations: The Media, Personality, and Public Threats

“…Also, the credibility of threats is not the only dimension of how public and private threats affect crisis bargaining. One of the reasons for the efficiency of private communication is that public demands also can increase the audience costs of the target (Kurizaki, 2007;Zarpli, 2022). This mechanism is underinvestigated, especially in an experimental setting.…”

“…But to note, the model ofTarar and Leventoglu (2009) also provides a rationale for private communication. They find that, while only one side makes public commitments that side prevails in a crisis and avoids a war, there is a higher likelihood of war when both sides issue public commitments.3 Similarly,Trager (2017) argues that private communication behind closed doors often influences the inferences of diplomats and leaders on adversaries' intentions.4 On the implication of domestic audience costs on the target side, see alsoKurizaki and Whang (2015) andZarpli (2022).…”

“…The media published opinion pieces that the U.S. president's decision not to send U.S. At the time, the country was... (1) ... led by a different leader than the one in the current dispute (2) ... led by the same leader as the one in the current dispute ognize that audience costs can emerge in targets in interstate bargaining (Kurizaki, 2007;Zarpli, 2022). Since selection problems similar to the challenger side should be an issue, it may be worthwhile evaluating this idea experimentally.…”