When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: a Response to Rossi

Fritz, Kyle G.; Miller, Daniel J.

doi:10.1007/s10677-019-09997-3

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Benjamin Rossi (2018) has recently criticized our view on similar grounds, arguing that we cannot explain why all types of hypocrites lack the standing to blame. We defend against Rossi's criticism in more detail in Fritz and Miller (2019). In our response, we point out that hypocrites like Tartuffe may lack standing in a counterfactual sense: if they were disposed to blame, they would (supposing they were still hypocritical) lack the standing to do so.…”

Section: Isserow and Klein's Moral Authority Viewmentioning

confidence: 87%

The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame

Fritz¹,

Miller²

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one's moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. She raises a challenge: one must explain what is distinct about hypocritical blame such that the hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame, even if the arrogant or petty blamer does not. Of those writing on hypocrisy, only we offer a direct response to Bell's challenge. Recently, however, our account has come under criticism. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses Bell's challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because answering Bell's challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best on offer.

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Section: Isserow and Klein's Moral Authority Viewmentioning

confidence: 87%

The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame

Fritz¹,

Miller²

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

Self Cite

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“…1 Two established accounts offer different explanations for this fact. The moral equality account (ME) maintains that hypocrites lack the standing to blame for relevantly similar faults in virtue of the fact that their hypocrisy involves a violation or implicit rejection of the moral equality of persons (Wallace 2010;Fritz & Miller 2018;2019a;2019b). 2 The taking norms seriously account (TNS), on the other hand, maintains that hypocrites lack the standing to blame because they fail to be sufficiently committed to the norms they blame others for violating (Rossi 2018;Todd 2019;Riedener 2019;Lippert-Rasmussen 2020).…”

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confidence: 99%

Two Problems of Self-Blame for Accounts of Moral Standing

Fritz

Miller

2022

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Traditionally, those writing on blame have been concerned with blaming others, including when one has the standing to blame others. Yet some alleged problems for such accounts of standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. But this would lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, in addition to hypocrites, there may be hypercrites, who blame themselves more severely than others. Leading accounts for why hypocrites lack standing to blame others would also seem to imply that hypercrites lack the standing to blame others, but some may find this counterintuitive. We argue that neither of these problems from self-blame poses a unique threat to leading accounts of standing.

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“…However, see Piovarchy (forthcoming) for a discussion of the different uses of standing in the literature. 2 For competing accounts, seeCohen 2013, Fritz & Miller 2018, 2019a, 2019b, Isserow & Klein 2017, Piovarchy forthcoming, Rossi 2018, Scanlon 2008, Todd 2019and Wallace 2010. And, for criticism of the claim that hypocrites lack standing, seeBell 2013 andKing 2019.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Hypercrisy and standing to self-blame

Tierney

2021

Analysis

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In a 2020 article in Analysis, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame fails. To object to this account, Lippert-Rasmussen considers the contrary of hypocrisy: hypercrisy. In this article, I show that if hypercrisy is a problem for the moral equality account, it is also a problem for Lippert-Rasmussen’s own account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame. I then reflect on the hypocrite’s and hypercrite’s standing to self-blame, which reveals that the challenge hypercrisy poses for accounts of standing is different from the challenge Lippert-Rasmussen articulates.

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When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: a Response to Rossi

Cited by 9 publications

References 8 publications

The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame

The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame

Two Problems of Self-Blame for Accounts of Moral Standing

Hypercrisy and standing to self-blame

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