Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and thereby a rejection of the equality of persons, which we argue grounds the standing to blame others.Jeff and Kate take the LSAT, and both receive high scores. Unfortunately, each scores well only as a result of cheating -an act for which both of them are responsible and blameworthy. After each discovers that the other has cheated, Jeff reproaches Kate for cheating. In response, Kate sensibly calls into question Jeff's standing to blame her, saying, 'Look, you hypocrite, you've done the same thing. Who are you to blame me?' Call this case Cheaters. Cheaters illustrates an important point: there are some situations in which an agent, R, doesn't have the standing to blame another agent, S, for some fault -even if S is blameworthy for that fault. Sometimes this is expressed by saying that R doesn't have the right to blame S for some fault.The ethics of blame concerns the appropriateness of R's blaming S for some fault.

It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one's moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. She raises a challenge: one must explain what is distinct about hypocritical blame such that the hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame, even if the arrogant or petty blamer does not. Of those writing on hypocrisy, only we offer a direct response to Bell's challenge. Recently, however, our account has come under criticism. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses Bell's challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because answering Bell's challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best on offer.

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