When intensions do not map onto extensions: Individual differences in conceptualization.

Hampton, James A.; Passanisi, Alessia

doi:10.1037/xlm0000198

Cited by 20 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 47 publications

(82 reference statements)

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“…Even though natural kind categories elicited relatively more entity features, there is no significant gain in terms of ability to predict category judgments. These findings thus support the notion that there is no perfect link between category intensions and their extensions (Hampton & Passanisi, 2016;Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi, & Wang, 1999). Especially (young)…”

Section: What Kind Of Features Predict Category Judgments?supporting

confidence: 79%

Feature taxonomy: What type of features do children associate with categories and how do they fare in predicting category judgments?

et al. 2017

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Section: What Kind Of Features Predict Category Judgments?supporting

confidence: 79%

Feature taxonomy: What type of features do children associate with categories and how do they fare in predicting category judgments?

et al. 2017

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“…Stereotypical associations do not determine the extension of terms (Hampton & Passanisi, ). But they facilitate spontaneous inferences.…”

Section: Stereotypesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit

Fischer

Engelhardt

2017

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Stereotypes shape inferences in philosophical thought, political discourse, and everyday life. These inferences are routinely made when thinkers engage in language comprehension or production:We make them whenever we hear, read, or formulate stories, reports, philosophical case-descriptions, or premises of argumentson virtually any topic. These inferences are largely automatic: largely unconscious, non-intentional, and effortless. Accordingly, they shape our thought in ways we can properly understand only by complementing traditional forms of philosophical analysis with experimental methods from psycholinguistics. This paper seeks, first, to bring out the wider philosophical relevance of stereotypical inference, well beyond familiar topics like gender and race. Second, we wish to provide (experimental) philosophers with a toolkit to experimentally study these ubiquitous inferences and what intuitions they may generate. This paper explains what stereotypes are (Section 1), and why they matter to current and traditional concerns in philosophy -experimental, analytic, and applied (Section 2). It then assembles a psycholinguistic toolkit and demonstrates through two studies (Sections 3-4) how potentially questionnairebased measures (plausibility-ratings) can be combined with process measures (reaction times and pupillometry) to garner evidence for specific stereotypical inferences and study when they 'go through' and influence our thinking.

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“…Stereotypical associations do not determine the extension of words (Hampton and Passanisi 2016), but support automatic default inferences from words to features stereotypically associated with them. Such stereotypical inferences have been studied through reading times (Garrod and Sanford 1981;McKoon and Ratcliff 1980;O'Brien and Albrecht 1992), eye movements (Patson and Warren 2010;Rayner 1998), and event-related brain potentials (ERPs) Federmeier 2000, 2011).…”

Section: Stereotypical Enrichmentmentioning

confidence: 72%

Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences

et al. 2019

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This paper provides new tools for philosophical argument analysis and fresh empirical foundations for 'critical' ordinary language philosophy. Language comprehension routinely involves stereotypical inferences with contextual defeaters. J.L. Austin's Sense and Sensibilia first mooted the idea that contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from verbal case-descriptions drive some philosophical paradoxes; these engender philosophical problems that can be resolved by exposing the underlying fallacies. We build on psycholinguistic research on salience effects to explain when and why even perfectly competent speakers cannot help making stereotypical inferences which are contextually inappropriate. We analyse a classical paradox about perception ('argument from illusion'), suggest it relies on contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance-verbs, and show that the conditions we identified as leading to contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are met in formulations of the paradox. Three experiments use a forced-choice plausibility-ranking task to document the predicted inappropriate inferences, in English, German, and Japanese. The cross-linguistic study allows us to assess the wider relevance of the proposed analysis. Our findings open up new perspectives for 'evidential' experimental philosophy.

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When intensions do not map onto extensions: Individual differences in conceptualization.

Cited by 20 publications

References 47 publications

Feature taxonomy: What type of features do children associate with categories and how do they fare in predicting category judgments?

Feature taxonomy: What type of features do children associate with categories and how do they fare in predicting category judgments?

Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit

Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences

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