When more blame is better than less: The implications of internal vs. external attributions for the repair of trust after a competence- vs. integrity-based trust violation

Kim, Peter H.; Dirks, Kurt T.; Cooper, Cecily D.; Ferrin, Donald L.

doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.07.002

Cited by 460 publications

(514 citation statements)

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“…The teams in our study were newly formed which might curb long-term reputation management concerns. Yet, this focus does not limit generalizations that can be inferred from the present research, because many encounters in economic and business settings are with people with whom we have weak, rather than strong relationships (Granovetter, 1995;Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006) In fact, in line with our findings, it has been noted that a proactive, long-term focus to reputation management may be present in newly formed relationships (Kim et al, 2006;Meyerson, Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation 29 Weick, & Kramer, 1996). However, future research should address whether consistency effects are stronger and easier to detect in longer functioning groups and teams.…”

Section: Strengths Limitations and Suggestions For Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Feel Good, Do-Good!? On Consistency and Compensation in Moral Self-Regulation

et al. 2013

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Studies in the behavioral ethics and moral psychology traditions have begun to reveal the important roles of self-related processes that underlie moral behavior. Unfortunately, this research has resulted in two distinct and opposing streams of findings that are usually referred to as moral consistency and moral compensation. Moral consistency research shows that a salient self-concept as a moral person promotes moral behavior. Conversely, moral compensation research reveals that a salient self-concept as an immoral person promotes moral behavior. The present study's aim was to integrate these two literatures. We argued that compensation forms a reactive, "damage control" response in social situations, whereas consistency derives from a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance.Two experiments supported this prediction in showing that cognitive depletion (i.e., resulting in a reactive approach) results in moral compensation whereas consistency results when cognitive resources are available (i.e., resulting in a proactive approach). Experiment 2 revealed that these processes originate from reputational (rather than moral) considerations by showing that they emerge only under conditions of accountability. It can thus be concluded that reputational concerns are important for both moral compensation and moral consistency processes, and that which of these two prevails depends on the perspective that people take: a reactive or a proactive approach.Keywords: Accountability; Moral compensation; Moral consistency; Moral licensing; Moral self-regulation; Prosocial Behavior Moral Self-Regulation, Consistency, and Compensation 3 Feel Good, Do-Good!? On Consistency and Compensation in Moral Self-Regulation Every day we encounter numerous work situations in which we have to decide between right and wrong. In the morning, when choosing a new supplier, a warehouse manager may decide to choose for the more expensive one that is guaranteed sweatshop free or she may go for the cheapest offer. In the afternoon, she may decide (somewhat more trivially) to put in some overtime to finish an important deadline or to enjoy a drink on a sunny terrace. Recently, researchers who are interested in behavioral ethics and moral psychology have started to study these moment-to-moment balancing acts between prosocial and self-interested behavior 1 . This research has revealed important roles for the self and selfregulation processes in shaping our moral behaviors (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009;Blasi, 1983;Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009;Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009).Regretfully, this research has not yet resulted in an integrated model that informs us how self-related processes influence moral behavior. In fact, two distinct literatures seem to have developed independently. While both literatures rely on similar manipulations and measures of morality, they offer surprisingly opposite findings. On the one hand, a series of studies show that people with a salient self-concept as being a moral person disp...

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Section: Strengths Limitations and Suggestions For Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Feel Good, Do-Good!? On Consistency and Compensation in Moral Self-Regulation

et al. 2013

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“…Repeated trust games have been used to study trust building (Pillutla, Malhotra, and Murnighan 2003;Ho and Weigelt, 2005) and trust repair (Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow 2006;Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin 2006;Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan and Murnighan 2008). In our studies, we use a repeated trust game to study the influence of monitoring.…”

Section: Literature Review Experimental Studies Of Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Trust promotes cooperation (Pillutla, Malhotra and Murnighan 2003) and broadly impacts workplace behavior (Dirks and Ferrin 2001;Kim, Dirks, Cooper and Ferrin 2006). Managers who develop trusting relationships with their employees are more effective.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Promoting trust and trustworthy behavior, however, represents a constant managerial challenge (Ho and Weigelt 2005;Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks 2004;Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin 2006;Kramer and Lewicki 2010). Managers need to trust their employees to use organizational resources to accomplish workplace goals, but their trust is often misplaced.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Monitoring Influences Trust: A Tale of Two Faces

Schweitzer

Zhang

2018

Management Science

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Organizations operate more effectively when managers trust their employees. In many cases, however, managers and their employees have divergent interests. One common managerial approach to address the problem of misaligned incentives involves monitoring employee behavior. In this paper, we investigate how monitoring changes the behavior of both those who are monitored and those who monitor others. Across three experiments, we paired participants in repeated trust games with different monitoring conditions. In each iteration of the repeated trust game, a trustor must decide how much money to pass to a trustee. The money passed is either tripled or quadrupled; the trustee must then decide how much money to return to the trustor. In each of three studies, we included conditions with anticipated monitoring. When trustees could anticipate monitoring, they engaged in opportunistic behavior; they returned more money than they received when they anticipated that they would be monitored, but either returned a small amount or nothing at all when they anticipated that they would not be monitored. Trustors, however, failed to appreciate how strategically their counterparts would act and continued to pass money to their counterparts even when they were unable to monitor them. Across three studies, we find that trustors systematically over-relied on the compliant behavior they observed during monitoring. We discuss managerial implications of these results for designing and using monitoring systems.2

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“…There is a growing recognition of the importance of understanding why people react differently to such violations in order to better manage their future exchange relationships (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009). Past research has been focused primarily on verbal allegations or other offender tactics that might repair trust once it has been lost after a broken promise (Kim, Cooper, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2013;Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006;Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004;Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008;Tomlinson et al, 2004). Yet little attention has been paid to explore antecedents and characteristics of the relationship that might influence how a violation is perceived and ultimately managed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Incentives or Communication: How Different Are their Effects on Trust

Iwai

Azevedo

2016

BAR, Braz. Adm. Rev.

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This study investigates the effects of economic incentives and communication on the cognitive and behavioral responses after an alleged trust violation. We argue that these responses depend on the type of solution used to foster cooperation between agents. On the cognitive level, we compare the effects that structural (economic incentives) and motivational (communication) solutions exert on trusting beliefs and trusting intentions after an adverse event. On the behavioral level, we compare these effects on the willingness to bear risk. Our experiment shows that, after a negative event, relationships wherein communication is used to foster cooperation are associated to greater external causal attribution, greater perceived benevolence/integrity, and greater willingness to reconcile and to accept risks related to other's behavior. These findings suggest that relationships based on motivational solutions are more resilient to negative events than ones based on structural solutions.

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When more blame is better than less: The implications of internal vs. external attributions for the repair of trust after a competence- vs. integrity-based trust violation

Cited by 460 publications

References 48 publications

Feel Good, Do-Good!? On Consistency and Compensation in Moral Self-Regulation

Feel Good, Do-Good!? On Consistency and Compensation in Moral Self-Regulation

How Monitoring Influences Trust: A Tale of Two Faces

Economic Incentives or Communication: How Different Are their Effects on Trust

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