2020
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3679715
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When Tariffs Disturb Global Supply Chains

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Cited by 11 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Reshoring and shortening supply chains is part of this re-evaluated supply chain risk management. Also, governments could step in if firms do not take into account the social costs involved of supply chain disruptions (Grossman and Helpman, 2020). This could also result in shorter and less risky supply chains.…”
Section: Globalisation and Slowbalisationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Reshoring and shortening supply chains is part of this re-evaluated supply chain risk management. Also, governments could step in if firms do not take into account the social costs involved of supply chain disruptions (Grossman and Helpman, 2020). This could also result in shorter and less risky supply chains.…”
Section: Globalisation and Slowbalisationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7 Recent papers also study the effects of input tariffs in frameworks with relational GVCs and incomplete contracts (Ornelas and Turner, 2008;Antràs and Staiger, 2012;Ornelas and Turner, 2012;Grossman and Helpman, 2020).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our main contribution to this literature is to characterize analytically the role of bilateral oligopolies and firm granularity for the intensive-margin pass-through elasticity of an exporter's cost shock to the negotiated price. Related to our paper is a recent work by Grossman and Helpman (2020), who develop a bargaining framework of firm-to-firm trade to study the e↵ect of tari↵ shocks on the organization of supply chains. We see our work as complementary to theirs: While abstracting from the extensive margin channel, our model captures rich(er) pricing and pass-through patterns by allowing for both twosided market power and granularity.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Both the theoretical discussion, and estimation strategy can be easily extended to this case.7 The assumption of Nash-in-Nash bargaining is standard in applied studies of bilateral oligopolies, see, e.g., Collard-Wexler et al (2019) for a discussion. See alsoGrossman and Helpman (2020) for a recent application in the context of global value chains.8 Below, we discuss how the model can we extended to allow the possibility of renewed search to a↵ect the players' outside options.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%