When the Agent Knows Better than the Principal: The Effect of Education and Seniority on <scp>E</scp>uropean <scp>P</scp>arliament Rapporteur Assignment

Daniel, William T.

doi:10.1111/jcms.12028

Cited by 31 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…The ratio is calculated by dividing the number of codecision (COD) reports 11 obtained by a group by the number of members within that group. her seniority in the EP and expertise in the policy field, also matter (Daniel 2013;Yordanova 2011). …”

Section: Office Gainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Love, convenience, or respectability? Understanding the alliances of the Five Star Movement in the European Parliament

Bressanelli

Candia

2018

Riv. ital. sci. polit.

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The Five Star Movement (M5S) formed the Eurosceptic EFDD Group when it first elected its members in the European Parliament (EP) in 2014. Two and a half years later, the M5S sought, without success, to leave the Eurosceptics and join the Liberal group. This attempted change of transnational affiliation is puzzling: why has the M5S tried to leave the Eurosceptic group to ally with the most Europhile group in the EP? How could this U-turn be explained? Relying on several different data -the EUANDI party dataset, official EP data, and original interviews with members of the EP -this article provides a systematic answer to these questions. We test three general hypotheses on group membership in the EP, using the M5S as a case-study. We show that neither policy congruence nor the pursuit of office fully explain the M5S's observed or attempted alliances. We suggest, instead, that 'domestic politics' is the key driver of the M5S's behaviour in the EP. Political group membership is functional to the Movement's strategic objectives at home. This article shows that national-level explanations of transnational affiliation need to be given more consideration, and highlights the 'second order' importance of the EU arena with respect to 'first order' national strategic objectives.

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Section: Office Gainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Love, convenience, or respectability? Understanding the alliances of the Five Star Movement in the European Parliament

Bressanelli

Candia

2018

Riv. ital. sci. polit.

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“…Rule 45 §2, RoP merely states that 'the committee shall appoint a rapporteur'; formal votes on rapporteurships are rare (Corbett et al 2011: 159); and rankand-file group members have no or little say. Well-educated and senior MEPs are particularly likely to become rapporteurs (Daniel 2013), but it is unclear whether and how widely the likelihood of aligned objectives and responsive representation are debated in the process of report allocation.…”

Section: 'Gyroscopes' and Early Agreement: Are The Normative Criteriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Is informal politics undemocratic? Trilogues, early agreements and the selection model of representation

Reh¹

2014

Journal of European Public Policy

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Over the last two decades, the European Parliament (EP) has been empowered to make European Union (EU) legislation more inclusive, transparent and accountable. Yet, co-legislation has increased informalization and seclusion, as an ever-larger proportion of legislative acts is pre-agreed between Parliament and Council prior to first reading. This article asks under which conditions informalization is democratically problematic or tenable. So far, 'early agreements' have been criticized for their lack of transparency and accountability, their challenge to deliberation and inclusiveness, and their differential empowerment of 'relais actors'. Little attention has been paid, however, to the representation of the parliamentary principal in trilogues. This article draws on Jane Mansbridge's selection model of representation to fill the gap; it argues that representation with a strong 'selection core' and a weak 'sanction periphery' is, prudentially, best-suited for bicameral bargaining, and it introduces normative standards that make the selection model democratically tenable. A close analysis of codecision's current practices and institutions shows that these fall short of 'good deliberation at initial selection' and of 'narrative accountability'; 'ease of maintenance and de-selection' is approximated and 'transparency in rationale' is strengthened in the EP's 2012 Rules of Procedure. Future reform should, therefore, introduce two democratically crucial, yet hitherto neglected, measures: open deliberation about the appointment of rapporteurs; and reason-giving and justification (in addition to reporting back) by trilogue negotiators.

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“…In so doing, we re‐evaluate the finding by Hurka and Kaeding () that MEPs from the accession states were less likely to become EP chief negotiators in the 2004–09 term (EP6), and re‐examine their argument that this might have been due to a learning phase. This expectation is supported by recent research by Daniel (, appendix), who shows that it is common for MEPs from new Member States to be allocated fewer reports in their first term after accession. If MEPs and their national party delegations had to familiarize themselves with the functioning of the EP after the 2004/07 enlargement (Bailer, ), we would expect them to have accumulated this expertise after five years (De Clerck‐Sachsse and Kaczyński, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 66%

“…Most importantly, this pattern holds when comparing MEPs from the latest accession countries with first‐time MEPs from the old Member States. Daniel (, p. 844) shows that this finding is not limited to the ‘big bang’ eastern enlargement, but likewise holds for earlier enlargement rounds. It has been argued previously that this initial under‐representation could have been the result of a learning process for freshmen.…”

Section: After Enlargement: Learning On the Job?mentioning

confidence: 94%

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Learning on the Job? EU Enlargement and the Assignment of (Shadow) Rapporteurships in the European Parliament

Hurka

Kaeding

Obholzer

2015

J of Common Market Studies

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This article investigates the determinants of assignments to European Parliament negotiating teams comprising both rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs. We reexamine the argument that under-representation of MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) from new Member States on these key posts after enlargement might have been due to a 'learning phase'. We find that MEPs from newer Member States remain considerably less likely to act as rapporteurs during the second term after enlargement . Most importantly, this trend also holds for shadow rapporteurships under the co-decision procedure, which is when they matter most. This structural under-representation entails important implications for European integration, most importantly that MEPs from newer Member States are less able to influence legislation. We suggest that the patterns we find could be the result of reduced willingness, a more limited skill set, or a structural disadvantage of MEPs from the accession states in the report allocation process.2

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When the Agent Knows Better than the Principal: The Effect of Education and Seniority on European Parliament Rapporteur Assignment

Cited by 31 publications

References 29 publications

Love, convenience, or respectability? Understanding the alliances of the Five Star Movement in the European Parliament

Love, convenience, or respectability? Understanding the alliances of the Five Star Movement in the European Parliament

Is informal politics undemocratic? Trilogues, early agreements and the selection model of representation

Learning on the Job? EU Enlargement and the Assignment of (Shadow) Rapporteurships in the European Parliament

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