Where Are You? Consumers' Associations in Standardization

Abstract

The expansion of international standardization has reinforced enduring questions on the legitimacy of standards. In that respect, the participation of all stakeholders, including the weakest ones (unions, NGO, consumers’ associations) is crucial. Given the recognized role of consumers’ associations to express legitimate objectives, the question of their representation becomes central. In order to get a deeper understanding of their participation, this article explores the evolution of their representation within the Swiss national mirror committees of international standardization between 1987 and 2007. It probes the extent to which their participation is determined by the distinctiveness of issues supposedly related to consumers’ concerns and by their own use of standards. The empirical findings of our study indicate an underrepresentation of consumers’ associations and confirm the topical specificity of their implication in standardization processes. Finally, we found evidence that the use of standards in an association’s activities supports and encourages its participation in standardization committees.

The Evolution of Transnational Rule-Makers through Crises

“…When delegation of regulatory power backfires, the State takes most of the blame in the public opinion 99 and acts through extreme instruments such as bailouts or the enforcement of import bans. However, in the meantime, a peculiar organizational progeny evolves apace "in the shadow of the State," 100 detached from political constraints, which is difficult for the State (in its capacity as principal) to reverse due to substantial network effects that accompany the creation of new governance structures, coordination challenges among their overseers (principals), 101 political interferences that call for a light-touch regulatory and supervisory approach, 102 or cognitive constraints that the regulators face and that lead them to inferences that are often skewed by systematic information processing biases. 103 The fact that such public regulatory and supervisory authorities enjoy policy and bureaucratic autonomy exacerbates such phenomena, 104 as such independence is contained by ideological, operational, and communicative factors.…”

“…Purchase commitments ensure a steady demand for certified products that guarantees price premiums for 98 producers to undertake the necessary investments. 101 Certification managers raised concerns about the "magnificent claims" made by downstream companies joining an initiative while only sourcing a limited amount of certified products and receiving a positive image return. 102 While some schemes tackle this issue by strengthening their rules concerning claims about certified sourcing, 103 some organizations took structural steps to actively engage chain actors and require downstream entities to provide support to farmers in facilitating compliance with the standards.…”

“…99 Also, there was synergy between ISO's governance model and the terms in the TBT Agreement, which had adopted these terms from ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, 100 with some modification (Annex 1). 101 Moreover, the purpose of ISO standards to facilitate international trade aligns with that of the TBT Agreement. 102 The adoption of the TBT Agreement created incentives on the part of ISO to respond and adapt to ensure its continued relevance and to build and maintain its legitimacy within the WTO regime.…”

Global corporations and the governance of standards

“…For instance, comprehensive data collected on the inventory of all participants in ISO/CEN mirror committees established within the Swiss Standardization Association (SNV) in 1987, 1997 and 2007 show that business representatives were present in more than 90 per cent of so-called national 'mirror committees' in which ISO or CEN draft standards are discussed prior to taking part in international meetings. For their part, consumer representatives took part in 18.2 to 20.8 per cent of the committees, with one association alone accounting for more than a quarter of consumer participation (Hauert 2010). This can only bode ill for participation of civil society organizations in ISO and other international meetings, as experts taking part are chosen among such national mirror committees.…”

Les arènes de la normalisation internationale à l’épreuve de la participation : le projet INTERNORM

“…C'est aussi à ce constat qu'aboutit un représentant syndical européen : « la normalisation se caractérise par un paradoxe des 'grandes minorités' : les deux plus grands groupes concernés (370 millions de consommateurs, dont 165 millions de salariés dans l'UE) sont en minorité dans les comités de normalisation… quand ils y sont représentés » (Bamberg, 2004, p. 13). Les quelques auteurs s'étant intéressés à l'inclusion des associations dans les procédures de la normalisation ne manquent pas d'expliquer les obstacles à l'accès des comités techniques par le manque de ressources financières, temporelles et cognitives, si précieuses pour une activité où l'expertise occupe une place centrale (Dawar 2006 ;Fabisch 2003 ;Farquhar 2006 ;Flatters 2004 ;Hauert 2010 ;Wilcock & Colina 2007). Qu'il s'agisse de comprendre ou de formuler des propositions, l'expertise est au fondement de l'argumentation mobilisée dans les délibérations.…”