Where Do Peacekeepers Go When They Go?

Abstract

Recent developments in the availability of spatial data and the growing trend of spatial analysis in political science has given scholars the ability to account for local-level factors in the study of political violence and conflict management. In this paper, the authors contribute to this growing body of literature by employing geo-coded data to empirically explore a question central to the study of peacekeeping – when peacekeepers are authorized to enter a conflict, where do they go? In other words, what types of violence are peacekeeping forces most concerned with, and what geographic features might prevent or allow for the deployment of peacekeepers? Using the un mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the authors find that peacekeeping forces were less concerned with non-state violence (rebels fighting rebels) and instead focused on government-rebel confrontations and those instances in which government or rebels attacked unarmed civilians. In addition, peacekeepers are shown to cluster around transportation networks, densely populated areas, surface-based resources, and international borders.

Hot Spot Peacekeeping

“…Our control variable for international borders is the most substantive and consistent of our control variables followed closely by road networks. These findings are consistent with the previous analysis on just the DRC in Townsen and Reeder (). Our control for population density is significant in Angola, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone but never so in the DRC.…”

“…Although the prior literature on the determinants of PKO location has amassed a considerable amount of evidence regarding the various state‐ and international‐level factors that impact the types of countries PKOs find themselves in, there is almost no work that examines where PKOs go once they are deployed to a civil war‐torn country . The only exceptions to this trend are found in the work of Costalli () and Townsen and Reeder (). Using disaggregated spatial data on both civil war battles and peacekeeping operations, Costalli () finds that, although PKOs went to the most violent regions during the Bosnian civil war, they were largely unsuccessful in mitigating civil violence.…”

“…Using disaggregated spatial data on both civil war battles and peacekeeping operations, Costalli () finds that, although PKOs went to the most violent regions during the Bosnian civil war, they were largely unsuccessful in mitigating civil violence. Townsen and Reeder () also use disaggregated spatial data and find that PKO deployments are located close to road networks, international borders, and natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These works go a long way in moving us beyond merely identifying the countries where PKO forces are most often deployed, but they also possess some limitations.…”

“…For instance, communication problems are often acute after initial deployments and the movement of troops is often hampered by factions unwilling to cooperate with the peacekeepers. Communication and troop movement problems become easier to solve the longer PKOs are in a country as missions establish themselves along roads and infrastructure is repaired (Smith ; Townsen and Reeder ). Accurately predicting and deploying to civil conflict locations is, therefore, probably a hit‐or‐miss activity during the first few years of deployment as PKOs adapt to each conflict's specific environment.…”

Does quality matter? An evaluation of the relationship between United Nations peacekeepers and civil war violence

“…The logic underlying this position is relatively straightforward: if peacekeepers are not located in close proximity to violence, then they are unlikely to have an opportunity to influence the behaviour of local conflict actors. The most effective operations should therefore have the majority of their personnel located near potential 'hot spots' around the country, rather than deployed according to a 'convenience' logic that might see them stationed far away from the sources of violence (Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen 2011;Townsen and Reeder 2014;Powers, Reeder and Townsen 2015;Ruggeri, Dorussen, Gizelis 2018). Although not all studies agree that peacekeepers are effective when co-located with violence (Costalli 2014), the majority have found that geographic location is an essential component of success.…”