Recent developments in the availability of spatial data and the growing trend of spatial analysis in political science has given scholars the ability to account for local-level factors in the study of political violence and conflict management. In this paper, the authors contribute to this growing body of literature by employing geo-coded data to empirically explore a question central to the study of peacekeeping – when peacekeepers are authorized to enter a conflict, where do they go? In other words, what types of violence are peacekeeping forces most concerned with, and what geographic features might prevent or allow for the deployment of peacekeepers? Using the un mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the authors find that peacekeeping forces were less concerned with non-state violence (rebels fighting rebels) and instead focused on government-rebel confrontations and those instances in which government or rebels attacked unarmed civilians. In addition, peacekeepers are shown to cluster around transportation networks, densely populated areas, surface-based resources, and international borders.

One of the goals of peacekeeping operations is limiting the amount of violence that takes place during a civil war. However, peacekeeping forces cannot occupy every part of a country that is engulfed in a civil conflict. This raises the question as to where peacekeeping forces decide to go once they are deployed to a civil war‐torn country. In this article, we contribute to the burgeoning research that examines peacekeeping at the microlevel by attempting to determine whether peacekeeping operations go to those areas that are in most need of their help. Utilizing geocoded data from the UCDP GED and PKOLED projects, we use spatial analysis techniques to create kernel density estimates of civil war violence and peacekeeping operations at site‐specific locations. We then use these newly generated variables in a variety of regression models to determine whether the location of civil war battles influences the location of peacekeepers. The analysis confirms our expectations in that the location of violence significantly predicts the location of peacekeeping operations, but only after these operations have been in a civil war‐torn country for a considerable length of time. Contrary to our expectations, however, peacekeeping operations do not seem more adept at identifying and responding to government and rebel violence relative to attacks against civilians.

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