2012
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0333-y
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Where do preferences come from?

Abstract: Rational choice theory analyzes how an agent can rationally act, given his or her preferences, but says little about where those preferences come from. Preferences are usually assumed to be …xed and exogenously given. Building on related work on reasons and rational choice (Dietrich and List forthcoming), we describe a framework for conceptualizing preference formation and preference change. In our model, an agent's preferences are based on certain 'motivationally salient'properties of the alternatives over wh… Show more

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Cited by 57 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…18 Sharing this goal, several recent works in decision theory emphasize the importance of 'reasons for choice' or 'psychological states' over and above the choice behaviour induced by them. Some of these works explicitly employ mentalist terminology, such as 'epistemic states', 'knowledge', and 'beliefs' in epistemic game theory (e.g., Aumann and Brandenburger 1995); 'belief-dependent emotions' in psychological games (Geanakoplos and Pearce 1989); 'emotions' such as 'anger' or 'fear' (Elster 1998;Loewenstein 2000); 'thinking' and 'feeling' (Romer 2000); 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic motivations', 'ego boosting' and 'ego bashing' (Bénabou and Tirole 2003); 'rationales' (Manzini and Mariotti 2007;Cherepanov et al 2013);'moods' and 'mindsets' (Manzini and Mariotti 2012); 'motivating reasons' and 'weighing of reasons' (Dietrich and List 2013a;2013b;2015); 'experiences' (Dietrich 2012); and 'the minds of checklist users' (Mandler et al 2012).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…18 Sharing this goal, several recent works in decision theory emphasize the importance of 'reasons for choice' or 'psychological states' over and above the choice behaviour induced by them. Some of these works explicitly employ mentalist terminology, such as 'epistemic states', 'knowledge', and 'beliefs' in epistemic game theory (e.g., Aumann and Brandenburger 1995); 'belief-dependent emotions' in psychological games (Geanakoplos and Pearce 1989); 'emotions' such as 'anger' or 'fear' (Elster 1998;Loewenstein 2000); 'thinking' and 'feeling' (Romer 2000); 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic motivations', 'ego boosting' and 'ego bashing' (Bénabou and Tirole 2003); 'rationales' (Manzini and Mariotti 2007;Cherepanov et al 2013);'moods' and 'mindsets' (Manzini and Mariotti 2012); 'motivating reasons' and 'weighing of reasons' (Dietrich and List 2013a;2013b;2015); 'experiences' (Dietrich 2012); and 'the minds of checklist users' (Mandler et al 2012).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Menurut Dietrich dan List (2013), preferensi itu bergantung pada property of alternatif dan kondisi yang memotivasi agen. Alternatif tersebut dapat berupa konsekuensi tindakan, kondisi sosial, sekelompok barang, atau struktur kebijakan, sedangkan property yang dimaksud adalah karakteristik kemungkinan memiliki alternatif.…”
Section: Pendahuluanunclassified
“…Thus, when an agent prefers most the good that is for him relatively scarce, it might be too expensive (and thus not feasible) to assign to change how fixed underlying preferences manifest (see Karni and Schmeidler, 1990). Third, preferences can vary according to the different motivational states -determined by motivationally salient properties like varying technology and environment -through which alternatives are ranked (see Dietrich and List, 2013). Forth, commodities might be interpreted as Lancaster's characteristics (intrinsic properties of goods) for which different preferences represent varying consumption technology (Lancaster, 1966).…”
Section: The Basic Difficultymentioning
confidence: 99%