Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-Cloture Senate

Abstract

This article employs a three-pronged approach to test competing theories regarding the size of coalitions required for passing legislation prior to the adoption of cloture in the Senate. We compare predictions generated by a model derived from the theory of pivotal politics with those generated by the theory of universalism. To test these predictions, we first examine coalition sizes on the passage of significant legislation. Second, we analyze the size of coalitions on dilatory motions as a predictor of success in defeating legislation. Finally, we examine coalition sizes on tariff legislation to assess the degree to which politics in this policy area were majoritarian. We find that a pivotal politics-based model incorporating the median voter and veto pivot generally outperforms universalism in explaining lawmaking patterns in the pre-cloture Senate. Narrow majorities were quite successful at legislating, although minority obstruction fostered uncertainty about the threshold required to force a final vote when adjournment loomed.

Effort, Intensity and Position Taking

“…Some of these features (end of session effects, issue salience, Presidential patronage) have been discussed by others who have studied this period in Senate history, but our claim is that these effects are pervasive and systematic, not simply epicycles to be tacked onto pivot-based logic. For example, our model supports Wawro and Schickler's (2004) finding that as the end of the session approaches, filibustering by smaller and smaller minorities becomes more and more likely to succeed, but suggests that the magnitude of the end-session effect is conditional on preference intensities and position-taking benefits.…”

“…Similarly, Wawro and Schickler (2004) claim that decision making in the pre-cloture Senate was essentially majoritarian, except that as the end of the session approached, obstruction by smaller minorities becomes increasingly likely to succeed. Our model's implications are consistent with Wawro and Schicker's findings that there is no single pivot that applies to all Senate decisions, regardless of context.…”

“…Strictly speaking, the pivot prior to adoption of the cloture rule would have been the very last senator, that is, Senate decisions would have effectively required unanimity. Several scholars (Mayhew, 2003;Koger, 2004;Wawro and Schickler, 2004) have found, however, that slender majorities were often capable of winning both before and after the 1917 rule was adopted.…”

Peculiar Institutions: Slavery, Sectionalism, and Minority Obstruction in the Antebellum Senate

“…4 An important issue then is where proposals will be located in the ideological spectrum. Wawro and Schickler (2004) show that lawmaking in the Senate prior to the adoption of cloture in 1917 was, for the most part, majoritarian. That is, narrow majorities were generally successful at passing legislation.…”

Institutional constraints, legislative activism and policy change: The case of the European Union

“…The question of how institutions shape the behaviour of policy makers and governments is central in political science (Cox & McCubbins 2001;Krehbiel 1998;Tsebelis 2002;Wawro et al 2004). Tightening or relaxing institutional constraints has been shown to matter for a number of important issues like tax reform (Basinger & Hallerberg 2004), government budgets (Citi 2015;Franzese 2002;Jones et al 2009), monetary policy (Keefer & Stasavage 2003), property rights (Justesen 2015) and European integration (Christin & Hug 2002;Justesen 2007).…”