Which operating mode is the best? Consider different combinations of sales contracts and service methods

Líu, Hao; Kou, Xiaofei; Liu, Haibin; Gao, Honghu; Zhao, Xinyue

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2022.108069

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…LSP needs to pay a corresponding cost to carry out smart transformation, and with reference to the literature [27,35,37,[39][40][41], it is assumed that the smart transformation cost is C(e) = ge 2 /2, where g is the cost coefficient of smart transformation. The notations used in this paper are shown in Table 1.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract Design of Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Smart Transformation

et al. 2022

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A logistics service integrator (LSI) usually requires a logistics service provider (LSP) to carry out smart transformation in order to improve the level of logistics service. However, LSP’s smart transformation faces uncertainty in terms of investments and income, which seriously hinders LSP’s enthusiasm for logistics service innovation. In this paper, we construct a logistics service supply chain (LSSC) consisting of an LSI and an LSP to explore the incentive mechanism for LSPs to undergo smart transformation. As a benchmark for comparison, we first obtain the equilibrium results under centralized decision making and wholesale price (WP) contracts. Then, cost-sharing (CS), revenue-sharing (RS), and cost sharing–revenue sharing (CS-RS) hybrid contracts are proposed. It is found that when the CS coefficient is in a certain interval, the CS contract can increase the profit of LSI and the smart level of logistics service, but it will decrease the profit of LSP. With the exception that the wholesale price of logistics services will decrease, the equilibrium results under the RS contract and WP contract remain consistent. Only the CS-RS hybrid contract can achieve the perfect coordination of LSSC. In addition, by conducting numerical analysis, we find that the enhancement of the smart effect can encourage LSP to improve the smart level and increase the overall revenue of LSSC. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first study to explore the incentive mechanism between LSI and LSP in the context of logistics service smart transformation. Our findings guide the LSI in implementing an effective contract.

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract Design of Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Smart Transformation

et al. 2022

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“…In the past few years, owing to the accelerated growth of e‐commerce, collaborating with online platforms has become an increasingly prevalent practice among companies. Nowadays, many scholars at domestic and international have studied distribution modes, considering the selection between reselling and agency modes under the impact of various influencing factors, including data‐driven marketing (Liu et al, 2020), manufacturer's product quality (Zhang et al, 2019), private label launched by e‐retailers (Zhang & Hou, 2022), service methods (Liu et al, 2022), and consumer privacy (Wang & Du, 2023), etc. In addition, Chen et al (2022) consider the online spillover effect and survey manufacturers' online channel introduction and distribution mode choice strategies.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The interplay of information sharing and distribution mode choice under cap‐and‐trade policy in the ecommerce era

Li,

Guo,

Jiang

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper endeavors to examine the interplay between information sharing and distribution mode in the context of low carbon, while considering the cap‐and‐trade. The findings indicate that under the non‐information sharing, the manufacturer tends to opt for the reselling mode when the carbon price is high; under the information sharing, the manufacturer is inclined towards the reselling mode when both the carbon price and investment cost coefficient are high. Interestingly, we find that the information sharing decision of the platform triggers an induced effect on the distribution mode selection of the manufacturer, and this effect is bi‐directional and conditional.

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“…In the previous studies, scholars have examined the optimal channel service strategy of manufacturers and retailers. Taken together, their study mentions three main service strategies, which are manufacturer‐provided service, retailer‐provided service, and third‐party‐provided service (e.g., Li et al, 2016; Liu, Kou, et al, 2022; Shen et al, 2022). They study how to choose the optimal service strategy for manufacturers and retailers according to different research contexts.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logistics service strategy for e‐commerce supply chain: Interactive impacts of cost reduction effort and fairness concern

Chen,

Dong,

Pang

et al. 2023

Manage Decis Econ

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In recent years, the logistics industry has undergone tremendous development because of the growth of e‐commerce, providing supply chain members with various options for logistics service strategies. Furthermore, cost reduction effort (CRE) and fairness concern have become even more significant on the logistics operation for e‐commerce supply chain because of changing market conditions and consumer demands. Considering CRE and fairness concern, we propose a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as a leader to analyze how a manufacturer or a retailer strategically decides between two logistics service strategies, i.e., the manufacturer‐provided logistics service and the retailer‐provided logistics service. When the retailer provides logistics service in the absence of fairness concern, a “win‐win” outcome can be achieved. However, profit does not always increase in proportion to the logistics service cost factor when fairness concern is considered. Additionally, there is a situation where the optimal logistics service strategy for the manufacturer and the retailer is contrary to each other in different ranges of fairness concern intensity when the logistics service provider both has CRE and fairness concern. As a consequence, it becomes important for both the manufacturer and the retailer to balance their fairness concern and consider the effectiveness of CRE when making decisions about adopting logistics service strategy.

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Which operating mode is the best? Consider different combinations of sales contracts and service methods

Cited by 9 publications

References 43 publications

Contract Design of Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Smart Transformation

Contract Design of Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Smart Transformation

The interplay of information sharing and distribution mode choice under cap‐and‐trade policy in the ecommerce era

Logistics service strategy for e‐commerce supply chain: Interactive impacts of cost reduction effort and fairness concern

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