Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation

Abstract

Mediators are often thought to be more effective if they are unbiased or have no preferences over the issue in dispute. This article presents a game theoretic model of mediation drawing on the theory of "cheap talk" which highlights a contrary logic. Conflict arises in bargaining games because of uncertainty about the resolve of the parties. A mediator can reduce the likelihood of conflict by providing information on this score. For a mediator to be effective, however, the parties must believe that the mediator is telling the truth, especially if the mediator counsels one side to make a concession because their opponent has high resolve and will fight. An unbiased mediator who is simply interested in minimizing the probability of conflict will have a strong incentive to make such statements even if they are not true, hence the parties will not find the mediator credible. Only mediators who are effectively "on your side" will be believed if they counsel restraint.

Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms

“…Because many of the claims included in our analyses have implications for national security, it is reasonable to expect that states with similar alliance portfolios have similar preferences as to how disputed resources should be settled. 11 Our argument is applicable to both unbiased third parties (Kydd, 2003) and impartial third parties (Rauchhaus, 2006). Additionally, S-scores provide a consistent measure of preferences across time and space.…”

“…A number of scholars conclude that to understand the effectiveness of conflict management, we must account for the mechanism the third party uses as well as its preferences (Gent and Shannon, 2010;Kydd, 2003;Rauchaus, 2006;Schmidt, 3 The recent literature on conflict management makes a distinction between impartiality/ neutrality and unbiasedness (Kydd, 2006;Rauchhaus, 2006). Recent studies, however, have begun to address the puzzle of bias by exploring more than just the third party's preferences.…”

“…We conceive of bias in terms of a third party's interests, where a biased third party is one whose preferences are more closely aligned with one disputant than another (Kydd, 2003). Drawing on this conception of bias, we relate the preferences of a third party with the role that it plays in the process of conflict management.…”

When Can Mediators Build Trust?

“…A yet earlier draft was presented at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 5, 2004, and at the Harvard Political Economy lunch, and I thank the participants at all events for helpful comments. 2 For a review see Powell (2002). or power (Kydd 2003;Rauchhaus 2005;Smith and Stam 2003). 1 For a recent literature review, see Wall, Stark, and Standifer (2001).…”

Threats to Peace: Threat Perception and the Persistence or Desistance of Violent Conflict

“…Due to the potential impact of threat perception, such leaders may manipulate these psychological responses to derail a peace process. According to Stedman, the greatest risk to ending civil war comes from "spoilers"-"leaders and parties who believe that peace...threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it" [16] (see also [17]). Actual or perceived threats may be used not only by fringe groups or terrorists, but also by mainstream leaders [16] with a commitment to continued conflict.…”