Whistleblowing and diffusion of responsibility: An experiment

Mobilizing Users: Does Exposure to Misinformation and Its Correction Affect Users’ Responses to a Health Misinformation Post?

“…Although research shows that multiple corrections are more effective at reducing misperceptions (Ecker et al, 2011;Vraga & Bode, 2017), we might expect that from a users' perspective, seeing existing corrections may decrease the likelihood of responding because others have already done so, consistent with research into the diffusion of responsibility and bystander effect (Choo et al, 2019;Guazzini et al, 2019;Lickerman, 2010;Martin & North, 2015). Exposure to corrections may indicate that others have already helped, which may lead users to not respond.…”

Do bystanders react to bribery?

“…7 Our paper runs parallel to the growing, experimental literature on whistleblowing (e.g., Choo et al, 2019;Butler et al, 2020;Mechtenberg et al, 2020). The important remark here is that our monitors cannot be equated to whistleblowers, because they are not directly affected by corrupt transactions and do not fear retaliation, public scrutiny, or ostracism, as whistleblowers generally do.…”

Blame Game Theory: Scapegoating, Whistleblowing and Discursive Struggles following Accusations of Organizational Misconduct

“…Assuming that whistleblowers have strategic motives in the context of blame games (Choo et al, 2019), then the more they have to gain from positively distinguishing themselves from the organization in order to limit contamination or blame (Moore et al, 2011), the more likely they are to blow the whistle. In the specific context of a blame game, the goal of whistleblowers is to build positive distinctiveness by distancing themselves from the organization being accused (Choo et al, 2019). Whistleblowing therefore relies on a discourse that creates and supports this position.…”

“…Lacking power and status, whistleblowers rely on external relays to trigger change (Near & Miceli, 1995; Summers-Effler, 2002; Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016). While ethical and moral judgements are often seen as a critical precursor of whistleblowing (Chiu, 2003), we focus here on situations where the whistleblowing is triggered by strategic motives (Butler et al, 2020; Choo et al, 2019). The positive outcomes from such an opportunistic move can be an active driver and precursor of the act of whistleblowing in the first place (Culiberg & Mihelič, 2017).…”

“…Organizational members can engage in whistleblowing to blame wrongdoing on their organization as a whole (Culiberg & Mihelič, 2017; Near & Miceli, 1985, 1995). While scapegoating is an organizational strategy for shifting blame to a member of the organization, whistleblowing can be initiated by individual members, for their own benefit, to strategically shift blame to the organization (Choo, Grimm, Horváth, & Nitta, 2019). In the context of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, some bankers decided to turn their backs on their former employers and industry.…”