Whistleblowing from an International Perspective: A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Arrangements

Abstract

While there appears to be consensus amongst policy makers that legislation to protect whistleblowers is needed, the emerging policy question addresses what institutional framework is most fit to implement whistleblowing legislation. However, the institutions to whom whistleblowers report-which are in the literature addressed as internal or external recipients of whistleblowing concerns-have been given limited scholarly attention. Research has instead focused on motives, behaviour, and experiences of whistleblowers on the one hand, and whistleblowing legislation on the other. Particularly the role of external agencies, like ombudsmen, anti-corruption agencies, and Inspector General offices, in dealing with whistleblowing concerns has been under-studied. With the aim of starting to fill this research gap, this paper reports the findings of a comparative study of governmental whistleblowing agencies (other than courts) and non-governmental whistleblowing protection organizations (NGOs), as important examples of external recipients of whistleblowing concerns, in 11 countries with whistleblowing legislation. The study aimed to find similarities and differences between these agencies, and to identify challenges and dilemmas that the installation of whistleblowing agencies bring about. Data collection was done by means of 21 interviews with academic experts and high-ranking officials within the selected countries, and in-depth analysis of available (policy) documents and reports. This paper finds that in the studied countries, there is a trend to install governmental whistleblowing agencies that combine various tasks to implement whistleblowing legislation (e.g., advice, psychosocial care, investigation of wrongdoing or retaliation, and prevention of wrongdoing). When such agencies are absent or considered weak, NGOs may step in to fill the need. Whereas most governmental whistleblowing agencies have investigative tasks, in Belgium and in the Netherlands, investigations of wrongdoing and retaliation are done within the same department for the reason that these issues cannot be easily separated. Other agencies have separated these tasks to avoid conflict of interest or because different expertise is claimed to be needed for both. Further research is needed to analyze the effects of each institutional approach, and how to avoid conflict of interest, particularly the risk of partial investigations of wrongdoing. Our study also shows that while not many countries provide government funds for specific psychosocial care for whistleblowers, most governmental whistleblowing agencies do give advice to whistleblowers and invest in the prevention of wrongdoing or training of those who implement whistleblowing legislation. While providing important insights into the role of whistleblowing agencies in 11 countries, this study also develops questions for further research.

The European whistleblowing directive: a legislative barrier between journalists and their sources?

“…In detail, they state, 'We are concerned that such layered administrative burdens which fall on the whistleblower would unavoidably have a deterrent effect on the latter and would de facto act as an obstacle for the whistleblower to report to the media'. The expressed concern is in line with the findings of Loyens and Vandekerckhove (2018) that the strict conditions tied to external whistleblowing can severely affect the decision of potential whistleblowers when reporting their concerns. The EFJ (2019) goes on to argue that this contradiction would not only have a negative impact on media freedom in Europe, but also on the citizens' fundamental right to receive and impart information, as guaranteed by the Charter.…”

Speaking truth through power: Conceptualizing internal whistleblowing hotlines with Foucault’s dispositive

“…Parker et al, 2014) might on the contrary seek to incorporate employees, civil society groups or even randomly selected members of the public as ‘designated recipients’, who under certain circumstances could notify the public or take other appropriate action on the basis of a report, should the organization fail to do so (Du Plessis, 2015). However, the fact that such extensions of the whistleblowing hotline, which would arguably increase its democratic legitimacy, remain rare (though see Loyens and Vandekerckhove, 2018), perhaps speaks to an inherent limitation in the internal hotline; namely, the aspiration to limit the number of recipients of the whistleblowing report to a minimum. Where whistleblowing in its classical conception as a practice of ‘speaking truth to power’ is associated with values such as democracy and public interest (e.g.…”

“… 1. The term ‘internal’ is used here in order to distinguish it from ‘external’ hotlines (Vandekerckhove, 2010), in which the information becomes known to an agent acting on behalf of wider society, such as NGOs, whistleblowing agencies or an Ombudsman (see e.g. Loyens and Vandekerckhove, 2018). While some external hotlines have been implemented in the Danish public sector, the vast majority of hotlines in Danish organizations are internal, and hence the study limits itself to study the latter. …”

The Organization of Corporate Crime: Introduction to Special Issue of Administrative Sciences

“…Whereas many organization and administrative science scholars have addressed whistleblowing protection and whistleblower motives (Miceli and Near 2002;Lewis et al 2014;Roberts 2014), the institutional arrangements for whistleblowing have received much less attention. The contribution of Loyens and Vandekerckhove (2018) in this special issue fills this gap with a comparative case study of whistleblowing agencies in 11 countries. Their research indicates that countries are more frequently installing dedicated whistleblowing protection agencies, and describes the tasks, means, and organization of these agencies.…”