White House Staff Size: Explanations and Implications

Walcott, Charles D.; Hult, Karen M.

doi:10.1111/j.0268-2141.2003.00053.x

Cited by 10 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…I focus on aggregate institutional expenditures by each branch for the 1939-1997 period as an important dimension of institutional development concerning the size and scope of the administrative apparatuses for these elected branches of government.9 The first two explanations (excluding 9 As discussed earlier, branch expenditures serves as just one important dimension of institutional development, among others. Furthermore, an analysis of subunit or sublevel branch expenditures is not explored here since these institutions can play a shell game with resources among subunits for political or strategic reasons (Burke 1992: 12-13, 49-50;Hult and Walcott 1999;Wyszomirski 1985). intra-institutional incrementalism) are established elsewhere, and fail to distinguish between short-run and long-run institutional relationships.…”

Section: Competing Explanations For Institutional Growth In the Presimentioning

confidence: 99%

Separated Powers and Institutional Growth in the Presidential and Congressional Branches: Distinguishing Between Short-Run versus Long-Run Dynamics

Krause

2002

Political Research Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A central feature of the modern presidential and congressional branches has been its institutional development. Growth in the presidential and legislative branches reflect distinct short-run and long-run dynamics. In the former case, Presidents exhibit greater responsiveness to congressional branch efforts than vice versa. However, in the long run a steadystate equilibrium exists, whereby the Presidency cannot permanently exploit Congress. This proposition is empirically tested by applying a Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) statistical modeling approach to analyze constant dollar-branch expenditure data for the 1939-1997 period. The empirical evidence shows that an "opportunistic Presidency" prevails in the short run; in the long run; however, considerable evidence is obtained in favor of an institutional equilibrium consistent with the "iron law of emulation" thesis. On a more general theoretical level, these findings make the novel point that a critical distinction must be made between short-run and long-run dynamics when assessing institutional relationships involving the Presidency and Congress. for their helpful suggestions along various stages of this project. I also wish to thank Chris Lindborg for providing excellent research assistance.

show abstract

Section: Competing Explanations For Institutional Growth In the Presimentioning

confidence: 99%

Separated Powers and Institutional Growth in the Presidential and Congressional Branches: Distinguishing Between Short-Run versus Long-Run Dynamics

Krause

2002

Political Research Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Much of the current literature on the internal workings of the presidency is largely descriptive. Such literature includes, for example, research on communications (Kumar 2001(Kumar , 2003Maltese 1994), public opinion (Heith 1998), speechwriting, legislative liaison, and public liaison functions Walcott 1998, 2002;Walcott and Hult 1999; see also Collier 1997, Davis 1979, and Holtzman 1970.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Managing of the Presidency

Vaughn

Villalobos

2008

Political Research Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We argue that scholars of the presidency should begin to apply their rich descriptive understanding of White House organization and personnel to questions of causality. To help guide this effort, we offer a theory-driven empirical model that explains organizational performance. Importing theory from the public management literature, we show how scholars can use the Meier-O'Toole (MO) model to explain performance outcomes and dynamics for key political and policy functions within the institutional presidency. We introduce the MO model and discuss its potential impact on the field of presidency studies. F or longer than necessary, the scientific study of the presidency has labored under the reputation of being theoretically underdeveloped. Since at least 1977, when Hugh Heclo reported to the Ford Foundation on the dismal state of presidency research, scholars have been wringing their hands over this problem (Edwards and Wayne 1983; see also Edwards, Kessel, and Rockman 1993). Although some aspects of presidency studies have since seen considerable theoretical development, particularly research that examines linkages between presidents and external political arenas, the literature examining phenomena that occurs within the White House merits renewed attempts to develop empirical theory. 1 To answer this call for new theory-driven research on the internal politics of the executive branch, scholars need broad empirical theory that explains how the behavioral dynamics of actors within the White House shape presidential performance. 2 In this article, we introduce such a theoretical model: the Meier-O'Toole (MO) model. Imported from the field of public management, the MO model provides a rich theoretical explanation for why the modern presidency performs as it does. Our reference to the scientific literature on managing public organizations is appropriate because beneath the symbolic trappings and enormous amounts of power inherent in the modern presidency is a conventional public bureaucracy. 3 Moreover, the American presidency is a bureaucracy that itself is composed of a series of smaller bureaucracies, the success of which depends on how well these organizations, and the institution as a whole, are managed.This last point builds on the research of Walcott and Hult (1995Hult and Walcott 2004), who show that the functioning of the White House relies on the bureaucratization of specific important tasks. 4 Just as the president's administrative role centers on his ability to manage the numerous bureaucracies that compose the federal government, the skill with which the president does so depends on how well the internal bureaucracies of the White House are managed. Walcott and Hult provide scholars with an important base from which to develop empirical theory that explains presidential performance. Presidency scholars can extend Walcott and Hult's work by using the theoretical expectations derived from the MO model to examine how the functioning of these bureaucracies influences presidential performance.In this article...

show abstract

“…Finally, expenditure data possess two advantages over relying on staffing figures for assessing the girth of the presidential branch. Problems exist with EOP staffing data because positions and corresponding personnel can be shifted around, and thus provide a misleading portrait of its true size and scope (e.g., Burke 1992, 12‐13, 49‐50; Hart 1995, 114‐19; Walcott and Hult 1999; Wyszomirski 1985). This concern is obviously greater when analyzing individual EOP subunits.…”

Section: Defining the Organizational Girth Of The American Presidencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Presidents are thus marginalized in the policy‐making process because the institution is not well suited for policy activism, especially as it relates to the legislative process. Further confounding the president's dilemma is the expanding girth of the presidency as an institution (Hart 1995; Ragsdale and Theis 1997; but see also Dickinson 1997, 2003; Walcott and Hult 1999 for alternative perspectives) 2 . As a result of these evolutionary features displayed by this office during the latter half of the twentieth century, presidents have found it increasingly difficult to both formulate and adopt public policies that are large in terms of size or scope.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Secular Decline in Presidential Domestic Policy Making: An Organizational Perspective

Krause

2004

Pres Stud Q

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What has caused the secular (long‐term) decline in presidential domestic policy‐making activities over the past several decades? In a previously published article in this journal, Paul Light provides several interesting speculative reasons for this trend. I propose a general explanation for the secular decline in presidential domestic policy making that centers on the rising organizational size and scope of the institutional presidency. Specifically, I argue that the American presidency's greater than optimal organizational size and scope has hurt its domestic policy‐making activities in absolute terms. The suboptimal organizational size and scope of the presidency has also led to a deterioration of its institutional comparative advantage in policy‐making activities vis‐à‐vis Congress. Therefore, twenty‐first century American presidents possess a strong incentive to restrict the organizational size and scope of the Executive Office of the President as a means to strive for optimal institutional performance.

show abstract

White House Staff Size: Explanations and Implications

Cited by 10 publications

References 11 publications

Separated Powers and Institutional Growth in the Presidential and Congressional Branches: Distinguishing Between Short-Run versus Long-Run Dynamics

Separated Powers and Institutional Growth in the Presidential and Congressional Branches: Distinguishing Between Short-Run versus Long-Run Dynamics

The Managing of the Presidency

The Secular Decline in Presidential Domestic Policy Making: An Organizational Perspective

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About