Separated Powers and Institutional Growth in the Presidential and Congressional Branches: Distinguishing Between Short-Run versus Long-Run Dynamics

Abstract

A central feature of the modern presidential and congressional branches has been its institutional development. Growth in the presidential and legislative branches reflect distinct short-run and long-run dynamics. In the former case, Presidents exhibit greater responsiveness to congressional branch efforts than vice versa. However, in the long run a steadystate equilibrium exists, whereby the Presidency cannot permanently exploit Congress. This proposition is empirically tested by applying a Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) statistical modeling approach to analyze constant dollar-branch expenditure data for the 1939-1997 period. The empirical evidence shows that an "opportunistic Presidency" prevails in the short run; in the long run; however, considerable evidence is obtained in favor of an institutional equilibrium consistent with the "iron law of emulation" thesis. On a more general theoretical level, these findings make the novel point that a critical distinction must be made between short-run and long-run dynamics when assessing institutional relationships involving the Presidency and Congress. for their helpful suggestions along various stages of this project. I also wish to thank Chris Lindborg for providing excellent research assistance.

The Institutional Presidency from a Comparative Perspective: Argentina and Brazil since the 1980s

“…Krause (2002) found that changes in EOP expenditures are primarily explained by the institutional rivalry between the president and Congress. Dickinson and Lebo (2007) determined that it is primarily the White House's staff growth that is affected by presidents' evolving political relations, while the advent of "big government" more generally is a a better explanation for the growth of the EOP as a whole.…”

Reexamining the Growth of the Institutional Presidency, 1940–2000

“…It is precisely this long-term relationship between exogenous variables and presidential staff growth that Krause (2002) examines. He hypothesizes that the growth of the institutional presidency, which he defines as a change in EOP expenditures, is driven by both systemic and political factors, including the overall change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a growth in federal expenditures, the presence of divided government, and the presidential "honeymoon," as well as by the institutional rivalry between the president and Congress.…”

“…However, the authors also take different methodological approaches to their time-series data-choices that reflect different substantive interpretations regarding the form and causes of presidential staff growth. To determine what caused the "institutionalization" of the EOP, and whether growth in the WHO 11 As measured in annual constant-dollar expenditures (Krause 2002).…”

“…A plethora of explanatory factors have been posited, ranging from individual presidential managerial "styles" to political rivalry between the presidency and Congress to more systemic factors, including increases in presidential workload, government size, and policy complexity. Efforts to test these explanations have produced different and in some cases apparently contradictory results (Dickinson 2000(Dickinson , 2003Krause 2002;Ragsdale and Theis 1997).…”

Gender Differences in Local Executives: Public Policy and Intergovernmental Transfers in a Brazilian state = Diferencias de género en los ejecutivos locales: políticas públicas y transferencias intergubernamentales en un estado brasileño

“…The importance of the head of government has not gone unnoticed, of course (Gains and Annesley, 2010;Rosanvallon, 2010;Figueiredo, 2008;Krause, 2002;Moe and Howell, 1999;Manin, 1995). As Manin (1995) states, even in parliamentary systems, the prime minister has become a more or less presidential figure, with the campaigns being centred around each party's leader.…”