Who has the power in the EU?

Barr, Jason; Passarelli, Francesco

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.12.007

Cited by 48 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…7 The selection of national voting weights in the Council of Ministers of the European Union and its implied influence on the EU legislation have received a great deal of attention from academics, politicians and the general public and have generated a lot of controversies. 8 As it will be clear, we could of course reproduce the analysis for any measure different from the nucleolus. We have argued that the nucleolus emerges at equilibrium in models of lobbying models and also in the Baron-Ferejohn bargaining setting for a specific choice of the recognition probabilities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics

Breton¹,

Montero

Zaporozhets

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract We analyze and evaluate the different decision rules describing the Council of Ministers of the EU starting from 1958 up to date. All the existing studies use the Banzhaf index (for binary voting) or the Shapley-Shubik index (for distributive politics). We argue that the nucleolus can be considered an appropriate power measure in distributive situations and an alternative to the Shapley-Shubik index. We then calculate the nucleolus and compare the results of our calculations with the conventional measures. In the second part, we analyze the power of the European citizens as measured by the nucleolus under the egalitarian criterion proposed by Felsenthal and Machover (1998), and characterize the first best situation. Based on these results we propose a methodology for the design of the optimal (fair) decision rules. We perform the optimization exercise for the earlier stages of the EU within a restricted domain of voting rules, and conclude that Germany should receive more than the other three large countries under the optimal voting rule. * We would like to thank Moshé Machover, Josep Freixas and participants in the 10th international meeting of the society for Social Choice and Welfare for helpful comments. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics

Breton¹,

Montero

Zaporozhets

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…If we dene a cooperative game whose solution concept is the allocation of T among players, we can consider T as the worth of the grand coalition of the game, i.e., v(n) = T , see [23]. The topic of power assessment in EU's Countries has been extensively studied in recent years, and there is still a lively debate on the most suitable power index to be used (see [5], [19], [20]). We avoid delving into such issue which is beyond the scope of our paper.…”

Section: The Basic Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 The Shapley value is a world famous solution concept in Cooperative Game Theory, initially introduced in [27] in 1953 and then widely employed in Election Games, Bargaining Theory and many other areas. An exhaustive overview of power indices, including axiomatization and applications, is [23].…”

Section: The Atkinson Index As the Characteristic Function Of A Coopementioning

confidence: 99%

A Multi-Factor Inequality Approach to a Transfer Scheme: The Case of Common Agricultural Policy

Палестини

Pignataro

2013

SSRN Journal

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The purpose of this paper is to propose theoretical foundations on the impact of transfer scheme, e.g. Community Agricultural Policy, on income inequality within European Countries. First, we show that ex-post inequality (in the after-transfer distribution) may increase if either initial aggregate income or the amount of scal contributions are suciently high. Second according to welfare ordering, we characterize a multi-factor decomposition of the Atkinson index to gauge the impact of each income source on the inequality prole. Third, we introduce a methodology to construct a cooperative game played by dierent income factors (as net incomes and/or incoming transfers) explicitly measuring the cost of inequality across the population in terms of welfare loss. We nally rely on Banzhaf and Shapley values to determine the marginal contributions of each factor to overall inequality.

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“…Our long term calculations are based on the population forecasts of Eurostat. Ours is not the first to analyse the new voting system in the Council, but unlike Felsenthal and Machover (2007), Turnovec (2008) or Barr and Passarelli (2009) we look also at the long term effects using population estimates. Since the voting rules under the Lisbon treaty are based on population data, voting power is very sensitive to these values.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers

Kóczy

2012

Mathematical Social Sciences

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Decision making has become slow in the 27-member European Union and the Treaty of Nice distributed power in a somewhat arbitrary way. The Lisbon Treaty makes decision making easier, and streamlines the process by removing the most controversial element: the voting weights. The new system relies entirely on population data. We look at the immediate impact of the reform as well as the long term effects of the different demographic trends across countries. We find that the Lisbon rules hurt medium sized countries, especially Central Eastern European countries with declining populations most, while the United Kingdom is the clear winner.

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Who has the power in the EU?

Cited by 48 publications

References 12 publications

Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics

Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics

A Multi-Factor Inequality Approach to a Transfer Scheme: The Case of Common Agricultural Policy

Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers

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