Who participates in conservation incentive programs? Absentee and group landholders are in the mix

Bond, Anthelia J.; O’Connor, Patrick J.; Cavagnaro, Timothy R.

doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.12.067

Cited by 20 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…In addition a literature has developed around drivers of involvement in environmental initiatives and agri-environmental schemes (e.g. Siebert et al, 2006, Burton et al, 2008, Hanley et al, 2012, Raggi et al, 2015, Unay-Gailhard and Bojnec 2016, de Krom, 2017; and more recently, a focus on drivers of involvement in market-based instruments such as tenders and trading schemes (Morrison et al, 2011, Whitten et al, 2013, Blackmore and Doole, 2013, Motallebi et al, 2016, Bond et al 2017.…”

Section: Drivers Of Participation: the Adoption Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

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Identifying the Causes of Low Participation Rates in Conservation Tenders

Rolfe

Schilizzi

Boxall

et al. 2018

IRERE

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Conservation tenders are being used as a policy mechanism to deliver environmental benefits through changes in land, water and biodiversity management. While these mechanisms can potentially be more efficient than other agri-environmental and payment for ecosystem service schemes, a key limitation in practice is that participation rates from eligible landholders are often low, limiting both efficiency and effectiveness. In this paper we document and review potential causes of low participation in two categories: those that treat participation as an adoption issue focused on searching for the landholder, farm or practice characteristics that limit participation; and those that treat it as an auction design issue, looking for the different auction, contract or transaction cost elements that limit landholder interest in participation. We then model how landholders make choices to engage and bid in a tender, making three important contributions to the literature on this topic. First, we document the low participation rates in conservation tenders, mostly across developed countries, an issue that has received little attention to date. Second, we explain that a decision to participate in a conservation tender involves three simultaneous decisions about whether to change a management practice, whether to be involved in a public or private program with contractual obligations, and how to set a price or bid. Third, we explain that there are a number of factors that affect each stage of the decision process with some, such as landholder attitudes and risk considerations, relevant to all three. Our findings suggest that decisions to participate in a conservation tender are more complex than simple adoption decisions, involving optimisation challenges over a number of potentially offsetting factors.

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Section: Drivers Of Participation: the Adoption Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Those who participate may already have strong pro-environmental attitudes and better knowledge of the environmental issues (Moon et al, 2012, Blackmore and Doole, 2013. Similarly Bond et al (2017) identify that non-traditional farmers (e.g. absentee owners) can be important sources of participation.…”

Section: Drivers Of Participation: the Adoption Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying the Causes of Low Participation Rates in Conservation Tenders

Rolfe

Schilizzi

Boxall

et al. 2018

IRERE

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“…The Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges BushBids project (Australian Government, 2006; see also Bond et al, 2018b) Monitoring and evaluation of management and ecological outcomes were built into the BushBids programme design.…”

Section: Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges Bushbids Projectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Revealed-price schemes differ from fixed-price schemes in some aspects that may influence programme outcomes. For example there may be differences in participating landholders and their motivations and behaviours (Bond, O'Connor, & Cavagnaro, 2018b;Whitten, Reeson, Windle, & Rolfe, 2013;Wünscher & Wunder, 2017), and the programme's ability to accommodate heterogeneity in management and opportunity costs (Rolfe et al, 2017). Impact evaluations of revealed-price schemes are therefore needed to add to the existing literature on incentive outcomes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remnant woodland biodiversity gains under 10 years of revealed‐price incentive payments

Bond

O’Connor

Cavagnaro

2019

Journal of Applied Ecology

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1. Evaluation of conservation incentive programme outcomes is needed to direct future investment, however, monitoring of large-scale programmes is relatively rare. Research in this area has frequently relied on space-for-time substitution or similar designs, rarely controlling for counterfactual trends or potential learning or leakage effects using repeated measures taken before and after intervention at impact and independent control sites.2. Using a Before-After-Control-Impact (BACI) monitoring design, we investigate the ecological impact of a conservation stewardship programme, where landholders set their own contract price through a reverse auction. In order to maintain or increase species and structural diversity of remnant native vegetation, contracted landholders agreed to manage grazing pressure (from stock and feral animals), control weeds and retain fallen logs. We test whether impact sites (private land under contract) changed over a 9-10 year period relative to control sites (independently managed, non-contracted private land) and reference sites (public conservation areas).3. Modest improvements were detected in native plant species richness, log abundance and grazing pressure at impact sites compared with background changes observed at control sites. While log abundance and grazing pressure were directly managed at impact sites, the improvement in native plant species richness was assumed to be influenced by reduction in multiple pressures such as grazing pressure and weed abundance. 4. No significant intervention effects were detected in other variables including regeneration, plant litter cover, weed cover and canopy dieback. However, these variables did show changes over time which were likely due to weather, particularly an extended period of drought followed by unusually high rainfall.5. Policy implications. This study shows that revealed-price incentive contracts can produce biodiversity improvement compared with the business-as-usual scenario of native vegetation management on private land. The use of a Before-After-Control-Impact monitoring design enabled the separation of treatment effects from background changes such as those linked to climate and weather, demonstrating the importance of this approach for programme evaluation. We recommend the allocation of appropriate resources for monitoring and also highlight the S U PP O RTI N G I N FO R M ATI O N Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

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“…2018) and characteristics of participants (Bond et al . 2018), policy and political dimensions (Whitten et al . 2017), ecological change on properties participating (Burns et al .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Key questions for conservation tenders as a means for delivering biodiversity benefits on private land

Fitzsimons¹,

Cooke²

2021

Eco Management Restoration

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Summary In 2021, as part of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the world’s nations will meet to determine biodiversity targets for this decade, including area‐based protection targets. Conservation tenders (a form of market‐based instrument) have been used in several countries for the protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystem services within a defined area, mostly on private land. Conservation tenders are promoted as delivering cost‐effective and targeted investment/outcomes in the context of limited funding for conservation. Despite the significant investment in the approach, the resultant biodiversity conservation outcomes from these tenders have received relatively little research attention. Key questions on the efficacy of conservation tenders for achieving biodiversity conservation outcomes are discussed, to inform policy makers, programme managers and researchers. Questions include the following: (i) What are the conservation objectives that conservation tenders seek to address that other mechanisms cannot?, (ii) What have been the biodiversity outcomes realised as they relate to ecosystem/habitat representation or ecosystem services?, (iii) How do policy makers plan to realise biodiversity values beyond the term of the agreement given no publicly stated strategy on securing long‐term outcomes?, (iv) Is reporting of activities and results sufficient to judge changed biodiversity condition or delivery of expected outcomes at the end of the agreement, and are there efforts/plans/aims to follow up on outcomes post the agreement term?, (v) What proportion of successful tenderers have a protective conservation covenant in place prior to signing a tender or as a result of signing a tender agreement?, (vi) What do we know about the intentions and capacity of landholders beyond the term of the agreement and what has been the fate of agreements (and conservation outcomes) if they have changed hands during the course of the agreement?, (vii) Is the confidential nature of bidding in many conservation tenders missing the opportunity for collective or collaborative conservation efforts that can sustain learning and enthusiasm post‐tender?, and (viii) Is the information on ecological values (ecosystem type, quality, landscape context etc) presented or made available in a way to landholders that maximises likely bidding to ensure a large pool and thus programme efficiency?

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Who participates in conservation incentive programs? Absentee and group landholders are in the mix

Cited by 20 publications

References 47 publications

Identifying the Causes of Low Participation Rates in Conservation Tenders

Identifying the Causes of Low Participation Rates in Conservation Tenders

Remnant woodland biodiversity gains under 10 years of revealed‐price incentive payments

Key questions for conservation tenders as a means for delivering biodiversity benefits on private land

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