Who Pays a Visit to Brussels? Cross-Border Firm Value Effects of Meetings with European Commissioners

Biguri, Kizkitza; Stahl, Jörg R.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3339871

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Similarly, Biguri and Stahl (2022) find that US firms' visits to European Commission officials generate positive abnormal equity returns. Relative to these contributions to the literature, our results suggest that state-level global political ties also have an impact on stock markets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Global Political Ties and the Global Financial Cycle

Ambrocio,

Hasan,

2023

SSRN Journal

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Global Political Ties and the Global Financial Cycle

Ambrocio,

Hasan,

2023

SSRN Journal

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“…Aleksanyan et al (2021) find that political state visits improve cross-border mergers and acquisitions outcomes. Similarly, Biguri and Stahl (2019) show that US multinationals' connections to European policymakers lead to favorable outcomes in tax treatment and mergers and acquisitions. This paper, however, is the first to study the effects and value of state-level political ties on corporate financing particularly in international bond markets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Political ties and raising capital in global markets: Evidence from Yankee bonds

Ambrocio

Hasan

2022

Journal of Corporate Finance

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“…Lorenz (2020) focuses on the value of lobbying in the committee stage, in which interest groups help members of the committee identify which reform to propose. Biguri and Stahl (2022) show that firm value increases due to meetings with the European Commission, which has formal agenda-setting power in the European Union. Crepaz, Hanegraaff and Junk (2023) provide evidence that interest groups prefer lobbying earlier in the legislative process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections

Awad¹,

Minaudier²

2023

Preprint

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Interest groups are often highly selective regarding which policymakers to meet and when to meet them. How valuable are private meetings with policymakers as a function of their preferences and bargaining power, and when do interest group prefer access early or late in the legislative process? To answer these questions, we study a model of informational lobbying with a collective decision-making body and endogenous reforms. We show that the value of gaining private access to legislators depends not only on their ideological alignment with the interest group, but also on their ideological alignment with the median of the legislature and with the agenda setter. Moreover, the value of access to a particular legislator depends on the ideological alignment between the median and the agenda setter, even when that legislator is neither of them. Finally, we show that the agenda setter herself may not be a particularly valuable target and that she can be influenced by a simple cheap talk recommendation even though the interest group has transparent motives.

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Who Pays a Visit to Brussels? Cross-Border Firm Value Effects of Meetings with European Commissioners

Cited by 6 publications

References 30 publications

Global Political Ties and the Global Financial Cycle

Global Political Ties and the Global Financial Cycle

Political ties and raising capital in global markets: Evidence from Yankee bonds

Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections

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